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技能研究档案

executing-red-team-exercise

来源声明

Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.

保留作者的英文原始描述。它表达设计意图,不代表已验证的实际效果。

Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.

developmentreferencesscripts

研究摘要

机器生成分析,等待人工复核

以下观察来自确定性源码解析,不代表人工安全审查或受控任务评估。

来源描述:Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place. 此双语摘要由所收集的源文本和文件结构确定性地生成,等待人工编辑复核。

审阅范围

对所收集的 SKILL.md 及辅助文本/代码进行确定性静态分析。机器辅助候选和发现等待人工编辑复核;不评估动态行为或效果。

可观察能力

  • Workflow[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L64]
  • Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L66]
  • Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L83]
  • Step 3: Initial Access[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L97]
  • Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L107]
  • Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L118]

限制与范围

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

适用读者

  • 评估是否检查并安装该来源技能的实践者;此受众由产品语境推断,并非测量得到的使用情况。[证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L1-L39]

技能包含哪些内容

文件清单来自记录提交中的采集源码。路径与大小属于结构观察,不代表质量评价。

个文件
4
Markdown 文件
2
个脚本
1
个引用
1
大小
31.9 KB
结构复杂度
低

文件清单

路径类型字节
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/LICENSE其他11 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/references/api-reference.md引用1.7 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/scripts/agent.py脚本6.3 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md指令12.8 KB

SKILL.md 前置元数据

{
  "name": "executing-red-team-exercise",
  "description": "Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "red-team",
    "adversary-emulation",
    "MITRE-ATT&CK",
    "Cobalt-Strike",
    "detection-assessment"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Identifier Analysis",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "Message Analysis"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1592"
  ]
}

对运行顺序的一种解读

此工作流根据源码材料重建表面顺序。除非明确记录受控评估,否则它属于暂定解读,而非真实运行轨迹。

  1. 01
    判断

    When to Use

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“When to Use”;未经执行验证。

  2. 02
    操作

    Workflow

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Workflow”;未经执行验证。

  3. 03
    操作

    Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  4. 04
    操作

    Threat actor selection: Select an adversary group relevant to the organization's industry. For financial services, emulate FIN7 or Lazarus Group. For healthcare, emulate APT41 or FIN12. Map the selected adversary's known TTPs from MITRE ATT&CK.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  5. 05
    操作

    Objective definition: Define measurable objectives such as "Access customer financial data from the core banking system" or "Demonstrate ability to deploy ransomware across the domain"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  6. 06
    操作

    Attack plan development: Create a step-by-step operation plan mapping each phase to ATT&CK tactics:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

查看全部工作流候选节点 (54 个候选步骤)
  1. 07
    操作

    Initial Access (TA0001): Phishing, exploiting public-facing applications, or supply chain compromise

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  2. 08
    操作

    Execution (TA0002): PowerShell, scripting, exploitation for client execution

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  3. 09
    操作

    Persistence (TA0003): Scheduled tasks, registry modifications, implant deployment

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  4. 10
    操作

    Privilege Escalation (TA0004): Token impersonation, exploitation for privilege escalation

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  5. 11
    操作

    Defense Evasion (TA0005): Process injection, timestomping, indicator removal

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  6. 12
    操作

    Credential Access (TA0006): LSASS dumping, Kerberoasting, credential stuffing

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  7. 13
    操作

    Lateral Movement (TA0008): Remote services, pass-the-hash, remote desktop

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  8. 14
    操作

    Collection/Exfiltration (TA0009/TA0010): Data staging, exfiltration over C2

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  9. 15
    操作

    Deconfliction plan: Establish procedures for the white cell to distinguish red team activity from actual threats

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”;未经执行验证。

  10. 16
    操作

    Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  11. 17
    操作

    C2 infrastructure: Deploy primary C2 server behind redirectors that filter Blue Team investigation traffic. Use domain fronting or legitimate cloud services (Azure CDN, CloudFront) to blend C2 traffic with normal web traffic.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  12. 18
    操作

    Phishing infrastructure: Register aged domains (30+ days old), configure SPF/DKIM/DMARC, and build credential harvesting or payload delivery pages

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  13. 19
    操作

    Payload development: Create custom implants or configure C2 framework payloads with:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  14. 20
    操作

    AMSI bypass for PowerShell execution

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  15. 21
    操作

    ETW patching to evade security product telemetry

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  16. 22
    操作

    Sleep masking and memory encryption to defeat memory scanning

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  17. 23
    操作

    Signed binary proxy execution (rundll32, msbuild, regsvr32) for defense evasion

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  18. 24
    操作

    Staging infrastructure: Set up file hosting for second-stage payloads, exfiltration drop servers, and backup communication channels

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  19. 25
    操作

    OPSEC verification: Test the entire infrastructure against the same EDR/AV products deployed in the target environment before going live

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”;未经执行验证。

  20. 26
    操作

    Step 3: Initial Access

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  21. 27
    操作

    Phishing campaign: Send targeted spear-phishing emails to selected employees with weaponized documents or credential harvesting links. Use pretexts based on OSINT gathered during reconnaissance.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  22. 28
    操作

    External exploitation: Exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications (VPN portals, web applications, email servers) identified during reconnaissance

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  23. 29
    判断

    Physical access: If in scope, attempt physical access to deploy network implants (LAN Turtle, Bash Bunny) or USB drops

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  24. 30
    判断

    Supply chain: If in scope, compromise a vendor or supplier relationship to gain indirect access

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  25. 31
    操作

    Upon successful initial access, establish the first C2 beacon and confirm communication with the C2 server. Immediately implement persistence (multiple mechanisms) to survive reboots and credential changes.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Initial Access”;未经执行验证。

  26. 32
    操作

    Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  27. 33
    操作

    Internal reconnaissance: Enumerate the domain, identify high-value targets, and map the network using BloodHound and internal scanning, with traffic designed to blend with normal administrative activity

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  28. 34
    操作

    Privilege escalation: Escalate from initial user to local admin, then to domain admin, using the least detectable techniques (Kerberoasting over pass-the-hash, living-off-the-land over custom tools)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  29. 35
    操作

    Lateral movement: Move to target systems using legitimate protocols (RDP, WinRM, SMB) with stolen credentials. Vary techniques to test multiple detection signatures.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  30. 36
    判断

    Defense evasion: Continuously adapt to avoid detection. If a technique triggers an alert, note the detection and switch to an alternative approach.

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  31. 37
    操作

    Objective execution: Complete the defined objectives (access target data, demonstrate ransomware staging, exfiltrate data) and document evidence of achievement

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  32. 38
    操作

    Detection timeline: Record timestamps for every technique executed to later compare against Blue Team's detection timeline

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”;未经执行验证。

  33. 39
    操作

    Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  34. 40
    操作

    Detection gap analysis: Compare the red team's technique timeline against the Blue Team's detection log. Identify which techniques were detected, which were missed, and the mean time to detect (MTTD) for each.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  35. 41
    判断

    ATT&CK coverage mapping: Create an ATT&CK Navigator heatmap showing which techniques were tested and whether they were detected, missed, or partially detected

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  36. 42
    操作

    Purple team sessions: Conduct collaborative sessions where the red team reveals each technique step-by-step while the Blue Team identifies where detection should have occurred and writes new detection rules

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  37. 43
    输出

    Report: Deliver a comprehensive report including the operation narrative, technique-by-technique analysis with detection status, and prioritized recommendations for improving detection and response

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  38. 44
    操作

    Key Concepts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Key Concepts”;未经执行验证。

  39. 45
    操作

    Tools & Systems

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Tools & Systems”;未经执行验证。

  40. 46
    操作

    Common Scenarios

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Common Scenarios”;未经执行验证。

  41. 47
    操作

    Emulate FIN7 TTPs: spear-phishing with malicious document containing VBA macros that execute PowerShell

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  42. 48
    操作

    Initial access achieved through spear-phishing a marketing employee; macro drops Cobalt Strike beacon using rundll32 proxy execution

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  43. 49
    操作

    Internal reconnaissance with BloodHound reveals a path from the compromised user to a service account with access to the POS management server

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  44. 50
    操作

    Kerberoast the service account, crack the password, and move laterally to the POS management system

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  45. 51
    操作

    Demonstrate data access to cardholder data environment, staging simulated card data for exfiltration

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  46. 52
    操作

    Exfiltrate staged data over DNS C2 channel to simulate data theft

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  47. 53
    操作

    SOC detected the lateral movement at hour 47 but did not detect the initial phishing, macro execution, or Kerberoasting

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”;未经执行验证。

  48. 54
    输出

    Output Format

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Output Format”;未经执行验证。

潜在风险面

静态发现用于提示安装前需要检查的位置,不能证明一项技能安全、恶意或有效。

建议重点关注

收集的文本中有 18 项确定性词法发现需要复核。发现可能仅位于文档中,不证明已执行或可被利用;仅含二进制的文件未扫描。

网络访问已观察到
文件写入已观察到
凭据使用未观察到
中

文本提及网络访问

5 次命中

此源文件行包含 URL 或网络客户端。应检查目标地址、发送的数据和信任边界;静态文本无法证明实际发生了网络活动。 该规则在收集文本中命中 5 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

提示

文本描述或实现了文件修改

12 次命中

此行包含可能的文件写入或重定向操作。应检查目标路径和覆盖行为;静态审查没有写入任何文件。 该规则在收集文本中命中 12 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

高

文本描述或实现了文件删除

此行包含删除语法,也可能只是文档示例。应检查确切目标、递归范围和保护措施。分析器没有执行该命令。 该规则在收集文本中命中 1 处;此处列出 1 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

上下文可能消耗在哪里

发现、激活与资源层具有不同含义。只有使用指定官方方法并记录模型的运行时,才显示精确数值。

精确 token 计数不可用

在管线使用明确模型执行官方精确计数之前,包括文件清单在内的所有 token 值均为 null。

未使用要求的官方方法记录 token 测量。本档案不会用字符数、文件大小或估计值替代。

受控评估

没有受控评估

该技能仅具备以上标明的证据。不声称任何任务成功率、token 效率、延迟或质量优势。

尚未测试

在源码可见的情况下使用

安装命令
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

前置条件

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

示例提示词

未提供

附上限制条件的判断

优势

  • 快照包含 4 个收集文件、2 个 Markdown 文件和 1 个脚本文件,可进行源代码级检查。[证据:skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L1]

注意事项

  • 尚未确立功能、安全或模型质量结果。安装或发布前,人工复核必须检查源代码上下文和所有引用发现。
研究结论

仅为暂定的确定性静态清单;等待人工编辑复核以及独立的受控评估。不构成安装建议、安全保证或有效性声明。

从结构上保持可追溯

档案是对公开工件的限时阅读,而非背书。请通过来源链接检查确切的上游材料。

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/executing-red-team-exercise
来源类型
社区
提交
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
采集时间
2026年11月20日
最近核查
2026年11月20日
上游许可证
Apache-2.0
仓库星标
36,446
内容依据

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