Back to catalog
Static reviewDevelopment

Skill dossier

executing-red-team-exercise

Source declaration

Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L64]
  • Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L66]
  • Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L83]
  • Step 3: Initial Access [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L97]
  • Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L107]
  • Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L118]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L1-L39]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
31.9 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/references/api-reference.mdReference1.7 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/scripts/agent.pyScript6.3 KB
skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.mdInstruction12.8 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "executing-red-team-exercise",
  "description": "Run a stealthy, MITRE ATT&CK-mapped adversary emulation against an organization's people, processes, and technology, using C2 infrastructure (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Brute Ratel, Mythic) through the full attack lifecycle to test SOC detection and response rather than just find vulnerabilities. Use when executing a full-scope red team exercise, adversary simulation/emulation, or a regulatory exercise (TIBER-EU, CBEST, AASE, iCAST) with executive authorization and a signed Rules of Engagement already in place.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "red-team",
    "adversary-emulation",
    "MITRE-ATT&CK",
    "Cobalt-Strike",
    "detection-assessment"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Identifier Analysis",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "Message Analysis"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1592"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Threat actor selection: Select an adversary group relevant to the organization's industry. For financial services, emulate FIN7 or Lazarus Group. For healthcare, emulate APT41 or FIN12. Map the selected adversary's known TTPs from MITRE ATT&CK.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Objective definition: Define measurable objectives such as "Access customer financial data from the core banking system" or "Demonstrate ability to deploy ransomware across the domain"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Attack plan development: Create a step-by-step operation plan mapping each phase to ATT&CK tactics:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (54 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Initial Access (TA0001): Phishing, exploiting public-facing applications, or supply chain compromise

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Execution (TA0002): PowerShell, scripting, exploitation for client execution

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Persistence (TA0003): Scheduled tasks, registry modifications, implant deployment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Privilege Escalation (TA0004): Token impersonation, exploitation for privilege escalation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Defense Evasion (TA0005): Process injection, timestomping, indicator removal

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Credential Access (TA0006): LSASS dumping, Kerberoasting, credential stuffing

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Lateral Movement (TA0008): Remote services, pass-the-hash, remote desktop

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Collection/Exfiltration (TA0009/TA0010): Data staging, exfiltration over C2

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Deconfliction plan: Establish procedures for the white cell to distinguish red team activity from actual threats

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Adversary Emulation Planning”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    C2 infrastructure: Deploy primary C2 server behind redirectors that filter Blue Team investigation traffic. Use domain fronting or legitimate cloud services (Azure CDN, CloudFront) to blend C2 traffic with normal web traffic.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Phishing infrastructure: Register aged domains (30+ days old), configure SPF/DKIM/DMARC, and build credential harvesting or payload delivery pages

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Payload development: Create custom implants or configure C2 framework payloads with:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    AMSI bypass for PowerShell execution

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    ETW patching to evade security product telemetry

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Sleep masking and memory encryption to defeat memory scanning

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Signed binary proxy execution (rundll32, msbuild, regsvr32) for defense evasion

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Staging infrastructure: Set up file hosting for second-stage payloads, exfiltration drop servers, and backup communication channels

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    OPSEC verification: Test the entire infrastructure against the same EDR/AV products deployed in the target environment before going live

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Infrastructure Preparation”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Step 3: Initial Access

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Phishing campaign: Send targeted spear-phishing emails to selected employees with weaponized documents or credential harvesting links. Use pretexts based on OSINT gathered during reconnaissance.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    External exploitation: Exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing applications (VPN portals, web applications, email servers) identified during reconnaissance

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Decision

    Physical access: If in scope, attempt physical access to deploy network implants (LAN Turtle, Bash Bunny) or USB drops

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Decision

    Supply chain: If in scope, compromise a vendor or supplier relationship to gain indirect access

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Upon successful initial access, establish the first C2 beacon and confirm communication with the C2 server. Immediately implement persistence (multiple mechanisms) to survive reboots and credential changes.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Initial Access”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Internal reconnaissance: Enumerate the domain, identify high-value targets, and map the network using BloodHound and internal scanning, with traffic designed to blend with normal administrative activity

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Privilege escalation: Escalate from initial user to local admin, then to domain admin, using the least detectable techniques (Kerberoasting over pass-the-hash, living-off-the-land over custom tools)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Lateral movement: Move to target systems using legitimate protocols (RDP, WinRM, SMB) with stolen credentials. Vary techniques to test multiple detection signatures.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Decision

    Defense evasion: Continuously adapt to avoid detection. If a technique triggers an alert, note the detection and switch to an alternative approach.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Objective execution: Complete the defined objectives (access target data, demonstrate ransomware staging, exfiltrate data) and document evidence of achievement

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Detection timeline: Record timestamps for every technique executed to later compare against Blue Team's detection timeline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Post-Exploitation and Objective Completion”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Detection gap analysis: Compare the red team's technique timeline against the Blue Team's detection log. Identify which techniques were detected, which were missed, and the mean time to detect (MTTD) for each.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Decision

    ATT&CK coverage mapping: Create an ATT&CK Navigator heatmap showing which techniques were tested and whether they were detected, missed, or partially detected

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Purple team sessions: Conduct collaborative sessions where the red team reveals each technique step-by-step while the Blue Team identifies where detection should have occurred and writes new detection rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Output

    Report: Deliver a comprehensive report including the operation narrative, technique-by-technique analysis with detection status, and prioritized recommendations for improving detection and response

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Purple Team Integration and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Emulate FIN7 TTPs: spear-phishing with malicious document containing VBA macros that execute PowerShell

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Initial access achieved through spear-phishing a marketing employee; macro drops Cobalt Strike beacon using rundll32 proxy execution

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Internal reconnaissance with BloodHound reveals a path from the compromised user to a service account with access to the POS management server

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Action

    Kerberoast the service account, crack the password, and move laterally to the POS management system

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Action

    Demonstrate data access to cardholder data environment, staging simulated card data for exfiltration

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  46. 52
    Action

    Exfiltrate staged data over DNS C2 channel to simulate data theft

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  47. 53
    Action

    SOC detected the lateral movement at hour 47 but did not detect the initial phishing, macro execution, or Kerberoasting

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Adversary Emulation of FIN7 Against a Retail Company”; not verified execution.

  48. 54
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

18 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

5 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 5 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

12 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 12 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

File deletion is described or implemented

Deletion syntax occurs in this line, including possible documentation. Review its exact target, recursive scope, and safeguards. The analyzer did not execute it. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/executing-red-team-exercise/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/executing-red-team-exercise
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.