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技能研究档案

auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs

来源声明

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.

保留作者的英文原始描述。它表达设计意图,不代表已验证的实际效果。

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.

developmentreferencesscripts

研究摘要

机器生成分析,等待人工复核

以下观察来自确定性源码解析,不代表人工安全审查或受控任务评估。

来源描述:Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting. 此双语摘要由所收集的源文本和文件结构确定性地生成,等待人工编辑复核。

审阅范围

对所收集的 SKILL.md 及辅助文本/代码进行确定性静态分析。机器辅助候选和发现等待人工编辑复核;不评估动态行为或效果。

可观察能力

  • Workflow[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L68]
  • Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L79]
  • Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L89]
  • Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L100]

限制与范围

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

适用读者

  • 评估是否检查并安装该来源技能的实践者;此受众由产品语境推断,并非测量得到的使用情况。[证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L1-L35]

技能包含哪些内容

文件清单来自记录提交中的采集源码。路径与大小属于结构观察,不代表质量评价。

个文件
4
Markdown 文件
2
个脚本
1
个引用
1
大小
71.1 KB
结构复杂度
低

文件清单

路径类型字节
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/LICENSE其他11 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/references/api-reference.md引用6.4 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/scripts/agent.py脚本38.3 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md指令15.4 KB

SKILL.md 前置元数据

{
  "name": "auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs",
  "description": "Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-intelligence",
  "tags": [
    "certificate-transparency",
    "CT-logs",
    "crt-sh",
    "subdomain-discovery",
    "TLS-monitoring",
    "RFC-6962"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-05",
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1596.003",
    "T1583.001",
    "T1587.003",
    "T1593",
    "T1566.002"
  ]
}

对运行顺序的一种解读

此工作流根据源码材料重建表面顺序。除非明确记录受控评估,否则它属于暂定解读,而非真实运行轨迹。

  1. 01
    判断

    When to Use

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“When to Use”;未经执行验证。

  2. 02
    操作

    Workflow

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Workflow”;未经执行验证。

  3. 03
    操作

    Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

  4. 04
    操作

    Define monitoring scope: List all owned root domains, registered brand names, and known subsidiaries. Include wildcard patterns (`%.example.com`) for comprehensive subdomain coverage.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

  5. 05
    输出

    Query crt.sh for historical certificates: Use the crt.sh JSON API to retrieve all known certificates for each domain. The API endpoint `https://crt.sh/?q=%.example.com&output=json` returns certificates matching the wildcard pattern with fields including `issuercaid`, `issuername`, `commonname`, `namevalue`, `notbefore`, `notafter`, and `serialnumber`.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

  6. 06
    操作

    Build baseline database: Store the initial certificate set in a local SQLite database with columns for certificate ID, domain, issuer, validity dates, SANs (Subject Alternative Names), and first-seen timestamp. This baseline prevents alerting on already-known certificates.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

查看全部工作流候选节点 (51 个候选步骤)
  1. 07
    操作

    Identify authorized CAs: From the baseline, extract the set of Certificate Authorities that have legitimately issued certificates for your domains. Any future issuance from a CA not in this set triggers a high-priority alert.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

  2. 08
    操作

    Map subdomains: Extract all unique subdomains from the `namevalue` field across all certificates to build an initial subdomain inventory.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”;未经执行验证。

  3. 09
    操作

    Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  4. 10
    操作

    Poll crt.sh periodically: Query the crt.sh API at regular intervals (every 15-60 minutes) for new certificates. Use the `exclude=expired` parameter to focus on currently valid certificates. Compare results against the baseline database to identify new entries.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  5. 11
    操作

    Parse certificate details: For each new certificate, extract the full SAN list, issuer chain, validity period, key type and size, CT log SCT (Signed Certificate Timestamp) details, and certificate fingerprint (SHA-256).

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  6. 12
    输出

    Detect precertificates: CT logs include precertificates (poisoned certificates submitted before final issuance). Track these as early warnings since they indicate a certificate is about to be issued but may not yet be active.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  7. 13
    操作

    Monitor CT log Signed Tree Heads (STH): For advanced monitoring, query CT log servers directly to fetch the latest STH and verify consistency proofs between consecutive tree heads. An inconsistency indicates log misbehavior (split-view attack).

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  8. 14
    操作

    Rate limiting awareness: Respect crt.sh rate limits by spacing queries and caching responses. Implement exponential backoff on HTTP 429 responses. For high-volume monitoring, consider querying the crt.sh PostgreSQL interface directly at `crt.sh:5432`.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  9. 15
    操作

    Atom/RSS feed alternative: Subscribe to crt.sh's Atom feed for lighter-weight monitoring: `https://crt.sh/atom?q=%25.example.com` provides real-time notification of new log entries.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”;未经执行验证。

  10. 16
    操作

    Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  11. 17
    操作

    Extract and validate subdomains found in certificate transparency data:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  12. 18
    操作

    Wildcard expansion: Certificates with wildcard SANs (`.dev.example.com`) reveal the existence of subdomains that may not be in DNS zone files. Record the parent domain as a target for further enumeration.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  13. 19
    操作

    Historical certificate mining: Query crt.sh without the `exclude=expired` parameter to find subdomains from expired certificates that may still resolve in DNS. These represent historical infrastructure that could be vulnerable to subdomain takeover.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  14. 20
    判断

    DNS validation: For each discovered subdomain, perform DNS resolution (A, AAAA, CNAME records) to determine if the subdomain is currently active. Cross-reference with known IP ranges to identify shadow IT or unauthorized services.

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  15. 21
    操作

    Typosquat detection: Generate permutations of the monitored domain (bitsquatting, homograph, insertion, omission, transposition, keyboard-adjacent replacement) and query CT logs for certificates issued to these variations. Certificates for typosquat domains strongly indicate phishing infrastructure.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  16. 22
    操作

    Deduplication and enrichment: Normalize discovered subdomains (lowercase, remove trailing dots), deduplicate, and enrich with WHOIS data, IP geolocation, and HTTP response headers to prioritize investigation.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”;未经执行验证。

  17. 23
    操作

    Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  18. 24
    操作

    Unauthorized CA alert: Trigger when a certificate is issued by a CA not in the authorized CA list. This is the highest-priority alert as it may indicate domain hijacking, BGP hijacking for domain validation, or a compromised CA.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  19. 25
    操作

    New subdomain alert: Trigger when a certificate contains a SAN with a previously unseen subdomain. This catches shadow IT deployments and unauthorized services.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  20. 26
    判断

    Wildcard certificate alert: Trigger on any new wildcard certificate issuance, as wildcard certificates have broader impact if compromised and their issuance should be tightly controlled.

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  21. 27
    操作

    Short-lived certificate anomaly: Alert when certificates have unusually short validity periods (under 24 hours) that deviate from the organization's normal certificate lifecycle, as this may indicate Let's Encrypt abuse or automated phishing infrastructure.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  22. 28
    操作

    Expiration warning: Alert when certificates for critical services approach expiration (30, 14, 7 days) based on the `notafter` field from CT log data.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  23. 29
    输出

    Alert delivery: Send alerts via email (SMTP), Slack webhook, PagerDuty, or write to a SIEM-compatible JSON log format for integration with existing security monitoring.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”;未经执行验证。

  24. 30
    操作

    Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  25. 31
    操作

    Signed Tree Head (STH) monitoring: Fetch the latest STH from each monitored CT log via the `get-sth` API endpoint. The STH contains the tree size and a signed timestamp. Verify the signature using the log's public key.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  26. 32
    操作

    Consistency proof verification: Between consecutive STH fetches, request a consistency proof via `get-sth-consistency` to verify the log remains append-only and no entries have been modified or removed.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  27. 33
    输出

    Certificate inventory report: Produce a complete inventory of all certificates issued for monitored domains, grouped by issuer, with validity status and key strength metrics.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  28. 34
    输出

    CA diversity analysis: Report on how many different CAs issue certificates for the organization, identifying consolidation opportunities and single-points-of-failure.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  29. 35
    输入

    Compliance evidence: For organizations subject to PCI-DSS, SOC 2, or similar frameworks, CT monitoring logs provide evidence of certificate lifecycle management and unauthorized issuance detection capabilities.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”;未经执行验证。

  30. 36
    操作

    Key Concepts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Key Concepts”;未经执行验证。

  31. 37
    操作

    Tools & Systems

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Tools & Systems”;未经执行验证。

  32. 38
    操作

    Common Scenarios

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Common Scenarios”;未经执行验证。

  33. 39
    操作

    CT monitoring agent detects a new certificate from "FreeSSL CA" for `secure-login.bank.example.com` in crt.sh results, which is not in the authorized CA list (DigiCert, Sectigo)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  34. 40
    操作

    Alert fires as unauthorized CA + new subdomain, escalating to the security team within 15 minutes of CT log entry

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  35. 41
    判断

    Investigate the certificate: extract the public key, check if the domain validated via HTTP-01 or DNS-01 challenge, query WHOIS for the issuing organization

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  36. 42
    操作

    DNS lookup for `secure-login.bank.example.com` reveals it resolves to an IP address in a hosting provider not used by the bank -- confirming this is attacker infrastructure

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  37. 43
    输出

    Initiate incident response: request certificate revocation from FreeSSL CA, file a domain abuse report, add the IP to blocklists, and notify the anti-phishing team

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  38. 44
    操作

    Implement CAA DNS records (`bank.example.com. CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"`) to prevent unauthorized CAs from issuing future certificates

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”;未经执行验证。

  39. 45
    操作

    Query crt.sh for `%.target.com` and all known subsidiary domains, collecting 2,400 unique certificates spanning 8 years

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  40. 46
    操作

    Extract 347 unique subdomains from SAN fields across all certificates, including expired ones

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  41. 47
    操作

    DNS-resolve all 347 subdomains, finding 189 currently active with A/AAAA records

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  42. 48
    操作

    Identify 12 subdomains pointing to decommissioned cloud services (CNAME to S3 buckets, Azure endpoints) that are candidates for subdomain takeover

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  43. 49
    操作

    Discover `staging-api.target.com` and `dev-portal.target.com` which are not in the target's documented scope but are reachable and running older software versions

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  44. 50
    输出

    Present findings to the target organization showing the gap between their known asset inventory and the CT-derived attack surface

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”;未经执行验证。

  45. 51
    输出

    Output Format

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Output Format”;未经执行验证。

潜在风险面

静态发现用于提示安装前需要检查的位置,不能证明一项技能安全、恶意或有效。

有需要复核的项目

收集的文本中有 58 项确定性词法发现需要复核。发现可能仅位于文档中,不证明已执行或可被利用;仅含二进制的文件未扫描。

网络访问已观察到
文件写入已观察到
凭据使用未观察到
中

文本提及网络访问

15 次命中

此源文件行包含 URL 或网络客户端。应检查目标地址、发送的数据和信任边界;静态文本无法证明实际发生了网络活动。 该规则在收集文本中命中 15 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

提示

文本描述或实现了文件修改

43 次命中

此行包含可能的文件写入或重定向操作。应检查目标路径和覆盖行为;静态审查没有写入任何文件。 该规则在收集文本中命中 43 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

上下文可能消耗在哪里

发现、激活与资源层具有不同含义。只有使用指定官方方法并记录模型的运行时,才显示精确数值。

精确 token 计数不可用

在管线使用明确模型执行官方精确计数之前,包括文件清单在内的所有 token 值均为 null。

未使用要求的官方方法记录 token 测量。本档案不会用字符数、文件大小或估计值替代。

受控评估

没有受控评估

该技能仅具备以上标明的证据。不声称任何任务成功率、token 效率、延迟或质量优势。

尚未测试

在源码可见的情况下使用

安装命令
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

前置条件

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

示例提示词

未提供

附上限制条件的判断

优势

  • 快照包含 4 个收集文件、2 个 Markdown 文件和 1 个脚本文件,可进行源代码级检查。[证据:skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L1]

注意事项

  • 尚未确立功能、安全或模型质量结果。安装或发布前,人工复核必须检查源代码上下文和所有引用发现。
研究结论

仅为暂定的确定性静态清单;等待人工编辑复核以及独立的受控评估。不构成安装建议、安全保证或有效性声明。

从结构上保持可追溯

档案是对公开工件的限时阅读,而非背书。请通过来源链接检查确切的上游材料。

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54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
采集时间
2026年11月20日
最近核查
2026年11月20日
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Apache-2.0
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36,446
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仅对提供的文件进行确定性词法解析、YAML frontmatter 校验、文件清单、来源描述的工作流程提取和启发式暂定分类。由机器生成;无 LLM、执行、动态测试或人工编辑批准。