Back to catalog
Static reviewDevelopment

Skill dossier

auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs

Source declaration

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L68]
  • Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L79]
  • Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L89]
  • Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L100]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L1-L35]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
71.1 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/references/api-reference.mdReference6.4 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/scripts/agent.pyScript38.3 KB
skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.mdInstruction15.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs",
  "description": "Monitors Certificate Transparency (CT) logs to detect unauthorized certificate issuance, discover subdomains via CT data, and alert on suspicious certificate activity for owned domains. Uses the crt.sh API and direct CT log querying based on RFC 6962 to build continuous monitoring pipelines that catch rogue certificates, track CA behavior, and map the external attack surface. Activates for requests involving certificate transparency monitoring, CT log auditing, subdomain discovery via certificates, or certificate issuance alerting.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-intelligence",
  "tags": [
    "certificate-transparency",
    "CT-logs",
    "crt-sh",
    "subdomain-discovery",
    "TLS-monitoring",
    "RFC-6962"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-05",
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1596.003",
    "T1583.001",
    "T1587.003",
    "T1593",
    "T1566.002"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Define monitoring scope: List all owned root domains, registered brand names, and known subsidiaries. Include wildcard patterns (`%.example.com`) for comprehensive subdomain coverage.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Output

    Query crt.sh for historical certificates: Use the crt.sh JSON API to retrieve all known certificates for each domain. The API endpoint `https://crt.sh/?q=%.example.com&output=json` returns certificates matching the wildcard pattern with fields including `issuercaid`, `issuername`, `commonname`, `namevalue`, `notbefore`, `notafter`, and `serialnumber`.

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Build baseline database: Store the initial certificate set in a local SQLite database with columns for certificate ID, domain, issuer, validity dates, SANs (Subject Alternative Names), and first-seen timestamp. This baseline prevents alerting on already-known certificates.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (51 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Identify authorized CAs: From the baseline, extract the set of Certificate Authorities that have legitimately issued certificates for your domains. Any future issuance from a CA not in this set triggers a high-priority alert.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Map subdomains: Extract all unique subdomains from the `namevalue` field across all certificates to build an initial subdomain inventory.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Domain Inventory and Baseline”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Poll crt.sh periodically: Query the crt.sh API at regular intervals (every 15-60 minutes) for new certificates. Use the `exclude=expired` parameter to focus on currently valid certificates. Compare results against the baseline database to identify new entries.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Parse certificate details: For each new certificate, extract the full SAN list, issuer chain, validity period, key type and size, CT log SCT (Signed Certificate Timestamp) details, and certificate fingerprint (SHA-256).

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Output

    Detect precertificates: CT logs include precertificates (poisoned certificates submitted before final issuance). Track these as early warnings since they indicate a certificate is about to be issued but may not yet be active.

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Monitor CT log Signed Tree Heads (STH): For advanced monitoring, query CT log servers directly to fetch the latest STH and verify consistency proofs between consecutive tree heads. An inconsistency indicates log misbehavior (split-view attack).

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Rate limiting awareness: Respect crt.sh rate limits by spacing queries and caching responses. Implement exponential backoff on HTTP 429 responses. For high-volume monitoring, consider querying the crt.sh PostgreSQL interface directly at `crt.sh:5432`.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Atom/RSS feed alternative: Subscribe to crt.sh's Atom feed for lighter-weight monitoring: `https://crt.sh/atom?q=%25.example.com` provides real-time notification of new log entries.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Continuous CT Log Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Extract and validate subdomains found in certificate transparency data:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Wildcard expansion: Certificates with wildcard SANs (`.dev.example.com`) reveal the existence of subdomains that may not be in DNS zone files. Record the parent domain as a target for further enumeration.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Historical certificate mining: Query crt.sh without the `exclude=expired` parameter to find subdomains from expired certificates that may still resolve in DNS. These represent historical infrastructure that could be vulnerable to subdomain takeover.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Decision

    DNS validation: For each discovered subdomain, perform DNS resolution (A, AAAA, CNAME records) to determine if the subdomain is currently active. Cross-reference with known IP ranges to identify shadow IT or unauthorized services.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Typosquat detection: Generate permutations of the monitored domain (bitsquatting, homograph, insertion, omission, transposition, keyboard-adjacent replacement) and query CT logs for certificates issued to these variations. Certificates for typosquat domains strongly indicate phishing infrastructure.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Deduplication and enrichment: Normalize discovered subdomains (lowercase, remove trailing dots), deduplicate, and enrich with WHOIS data, IP geolocation, and HTTP response headers to prioritize investigation.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Subdomain Discovery via CT Data”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Unauthorized CA alert: Trigger when a certificate is issued by a CA not in the authorized CA list. This is the highest-priority alert as it may indicate domain hijacking, BGP hijacking for domain validation, or a compromised CA.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    New subdomain alert: Trigger when a certificate contains a SAN with a previously unseen subdomain. This catches shadow IT deployments and unauthorized services.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Decision

    Wildcard certificate alert: Trigger on any new wildcard certificate issuance, as wildcard certificates have broader impact if compromised and their issuance should be tightly controlled.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Short-lived certificate anomaly: Alert when certificates have unusually short validity periods (under 24 hours) that deviate from the organization's normal certificate lifecycle, as this may indicate Let's Encrypt abuse or automated phishing infrastructure.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Expiration warning: Alert when certificates for critical services approach expiration (30, 14, 7 days) based on the `notafter` field from CT log data.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Output

    Alert delivery: Send alerts via email (SMTP), Slack webhook, PagerDuty, or write to a SIEM-compatible JSON log format for integration with existing security monitoring.

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 4: Certificate Issuance Alerting”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Signed Tree Head (STH) monitoring: Fetch the latest STH from each monitored CT log via the `get-sth` API endpoint. The STH contains the tree size and a signed timestamp. Verify the signature using the log's public key.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Consistency proof verification: Between consecutive STH fetches, request a consistency proof via `get-sth-consistency` to verify the log remains append-only and no entries have been modified or removed.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Output

    Certificate inventory report: Produce a complete inventory of all certificates issued for monitored domains, grouped by issuer, with validity status and key strength metrics.

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Output

    CA diversity analysis: Report on how many different CAs issue certificates for the organization, identifying consolidation opportunities and single-points-of-failure.

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Input

    Compliance evidence: For organizations subject to PCI-DSS, SOC 2, or similar frameworks, CT monitoring logs provide evidence of certificate lifecycle management and unauthorized issuance detection capabilities.

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 5: CT Log Integrity Verification and Reporting”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    CT monitoring agent detects a new certificate from "FreeSSL CA" for `secure-login.bank.example.com` in crt.sh results, which is not in the authorized CA list (DigiCert, Sectigo)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Alert fires as unauthorized CA + new subdomain, escalating to the security team within 15 minutes of CT log entry

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Decision

    Investigate the certificate: extract the public key, check if the domain validated via HTTP-01 or DNS-01 challenge, query WHOIS for the issuing organization

    Source-described decision candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    DNS lookup for `secure-login.bank.example.com` reveals it resolves to an IP address in a hosting provider not used by the bank -- confirming this is attacker infrastructure

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Output

    Initiate incident response: request certificate revocation from FreeSSL CA, file a domain abuse report, add the IP to blocklists, and notify the anti-phishing team

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Implement CAA DNS records (`bank.example.com. CAA 0 issue "digicert.com"`) to prevent unauthorized CAs from issuing future certificates

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Certificate Issuance for a Financial Services Company”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Query crt.sh for `%.target.com` and all known subsidiary domains, collecting 2,400 unique certificates spanning 8 years

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Extract 347 unique subdomains from SAN fields across all certificates, including expired ones

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    DNS-resolve all 347 subdomains, finding 189 currently active with A/AAAA records

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Identify 12 subdomains pointing to decommissioned cloud services (CNAME to S3 buckets, Azure endpoints) that are candidates for subdomain takeover

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Discover `staging-api.target.com` and `dev-portal.target.com` which are not in the target's documented scope but are reachable and running older software versions

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Output

    Present findings to the target organization showing the gap between their known asset inventory and the CT-derived attack surface

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Attack Surface Mapping Through CT Log Subdomain Discovery”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

58 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

15 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

43 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 43 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/auditing-tls-certificate-transparency-logs
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.