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Skill dossier

detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk

Source declaration

Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service (WMI/PsExec/RDP) abuse. Use when hunting for MITRE ATT&CK TA0008 lateral movement activity or investigating suspected pivoting between hosts during an incident, with Splunk as the SIEM.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service (WMI/PsExec/RDP) abuse. Use when hunting for MITRE ATT&CK TA0008 lateral movement activity or investigating suspected pivoting between hosts during an incident, with Splunk as the SIEM.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service (WMI/PsExec/RDP) abuse. Use when hunting for MITRE ATT&CK TA0008 lateral movement activity or investigating suspected pivoting between hosts during an incident, with Splunk as the SIEM. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.md:L57]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.md:L1-L37]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
8
Markdown files
5
scripts
2
references
4
Size
42.9 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/assets/template.mdReference1.2 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/references/api-reference.mdReference1.5 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/references/standards.mdReference2.6 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/references/workflows.mdReference4.6 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/scripts/agent.pyScript4.9 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/scripts/process.pyScript12.5 KB
skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.mdInstruction4.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk",
  "description": "Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries against Windows authentication logs, SMB traffic, and remote service (WMI/PsExec/RDP) abuse. Use when hunting for MITRE ATT&CK TA0008 lateral movement activity or investigating suspected pivoting between hosts during an incident, with Splunk as the SIEM.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "mitre-attack",
    "lateral-movement",
    "splunk",
    "siem",
    "proactive-detection",
    "ta0008"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1021"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Define Lateral Movement Scope: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB/Admin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Query Authentication Events: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Input

    Build Authentication Graphs: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.

    Source-described input candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Input

    Detect First-Time Relationships: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.

    Source-described input candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (18 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Correlate with Process Activity: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Identify Anomalous Patterns: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Output

    Report and Contain: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.

    Source-described output candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    PsExec Lateral Movement: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    RDP Pivoting: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    WMI Remote Execution: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    WinRM PowerShell Remoting: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Pass-the-Hash via SMB: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

37 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Note

File modification is described or implemented

31 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 31 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Elevated privileges are referenced

4 occurrences

Privilege-elevation syntax is present. Confirm whether elevation is necessary and inspect every operation performed under it; static analysis cannot prove that elevation succeeded. This rule matched 4 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 8 collected file(s), 5 Markdown file(s), and 2 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.