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Skill dossier

detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs

Source declaration

Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries against domain controller event logs, looking for Kerberos TGT anomalies such as mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures. Use when hunting for Kerberos ticket forgery or krbtgt-based persistence (MITRE T1558.001) in AD environments.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries against domain controller event logs, looking for Kerberos TGT anomalies such as mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures. Use when hunting for Kerberos ticket forgery or krbtgt-based persistence (MITRE T1558.001) in AD environments.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries against domain controller event logs, looking for Kerberos TGT anomalies such as mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures. Use when hunting for Kerberos ticket forgery or krbtgt-based persistence (MITRE T1558.001) in AD environments. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/SKILL.md:L50]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/SKILL.md:L1-L31]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
23.4 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/references/api-reference.mdReference1.6 KB
skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/scripts/agent.pyScript6.1 KB
skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/SKILL.mdInstruction4.6 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs",
  "description": "Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory using Splunk and KQL queries against domain controller event logs, looking for Kerberos TGT anomalies such as mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures. Use when hunting for Kerberos ticket forgery or krbtgt-based persistence (MITRE T1558.001) in AD environments.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "golden-ticket",
    "kerberos",
    "active-directory",
    "mitre-t1558-001",
    "credential-abuse"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1003"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768): Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ/AS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Decision

    Detect Encryption Type Anomalies: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (16 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Detect TGS Without Prior TGT: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP/account, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Decision

    Monitor KRBTGT Password Age: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Validate PAC Signatures: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Detection Queries

    Source-described action candidate under “Detection Queries”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Post-DCSync Golden Ticket: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    RC4 Downgrade: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Cross-Domain Golden Ticket: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains/forests.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Persistence After Remediation: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

18 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

15 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Dynamic command execution is referenced

A shell, dynamic evaluation, or process execution primitive appears here. Inspect arguments and input control. Presence in source does not prove a command ran. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.