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monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies

来源声明

Monitors Modbus TCP traffic on SCADA and ICS networks to detect anomalous function code usage, unauthorized register writes, and suspicious communication patterns. The analyst uses deep packet inspection with pymodbus, Scapy, and Zeek to baseline normal PLC/RTU communication behavior, then applies statistical and rule-based anomaly detection to identify reconnaissance, parameter manipulation, and denial-of-service attacks targeting Modbus devices on port 502. Activates for requests involving Modbus traffic analysis, SCADA network monitoring, ICS anomaly detection, PLC security monitoring, or OT network threat detection.

保留作者的英文原始描述。它表达设计意图,不代表已验证的实际效果。

Monitors Modbus TCP traffic on SCADA and ICS networks to detect anomalous function code usage, unauthorized register writes, and suspicious communication patterns. The analyst uses deep packet inspection with pymodbus, Scapy, and Zeek to baseline normal PLC/RTU communication behavior, then applies statistical and rule-based anomaly detection to identify reconnaissance, parameter manipulation, and denial-of-service attacks targeting Modbus devices on port 502. Activates for requests involving Modbus traffic analysis, SCADA network monitoring, ICS anomaly detection, PLC security monitoring, or OT network threat detection.

developmentreferencesscripts

研究摘要

机器生成分析,等待人工复核

以下观察来自确定性源码解析,不代表人工安全审查或受控任务评估。

来源描述:Monitors Modbus TCP traffic on SCADA and ICS networks to detect anomalous function code usage, unauthorized register writes, and suspicious communication patterns. The analyst uses deep packet inspection with pymodbus, Scapy, and Zeek to baseline normal PLC/RTU communication behavior, then applies statistical and rule-based anomaly detection to identify reconnaissance, parameter manipulation, and denial-of-service attacks targeting Modbus devices on port 502. Activates for requests involving Modbus traffic analysis, SCADA network monitoring, ICS anomaly detection, PLC security monitoring, or OT network threat detection. 此双语摘要由所收集的源文本和文件结构确定性地生成,等待人工编辑复核。

审阅范围

对所收集的 SKILL.md 及辅助文本/代码进行确定性静态分析。机器辅助候选和发现等待人工编辑复核;不评估动态行为或效果。

可观察能力

  • Workflow[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L83]
  • Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L102]
  • Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L133]
  • Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies[来源陈述;暂定,未测试。证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L182]

限制与范围

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

适用读者

  • 评估是否检查并安装该来源技能的实践者;此受众由产品语境推断,并非测量得到的使用情况。[证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L1-L34]

技能包含哪些内容

文件清单来自记录提交中的采集源码。路径与大小属于结构观察,不代表质量评价。

个文件
4
Markdown 文件
2
个脚本
1
个引用
1
大小
64.7 KB
结构复杂度
低

文件清单

路径类型字节
skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/LICENSE其他11 KB
skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/references/api-reference.md引用4.9 KB
skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/scripts/agent.py脚本24.8 KB
skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md指令24.1 KB

SKILL.md 前置元数据

{
  "name": "monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies",
  "description": "Monitors Modbus TCP traffic on SCADA and ICS networks to detect anomalous function code usage, unauthorized register writes, and suspicious communication patterns. The analyst uses deep packet inspection with pymodbus, Scapy, and Zeek to baseline normal PLC/RTU communication behavior, then applies statistical and rule-based anomaly detection to identify reconnaissance, parameter manipulation, and denial-of-service attacks targeting Modbus devices on port 502. Activates for requests involving Modbus traffic analysis, SCADA network monitoring, ICS anomaly detection, PLC security monitoring, or OT network threat detection.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "ot-security",
  "tags": [
    "Modbus-TCP",
    "SCADA",
    "ICS-security",
    "deep-packet-inspection",
    "anomaly-detection",
    "OT-monitoring"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.IR-01",
    "DE.CM-01",
    "ID.AM-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T0816",
    "T0836",
    "T0830",
    "T1595"
  ]
}

对运行顺序的一种解读

此工作流根据源码材料重建表面顺序。除非明确记录受控评估,否则它属于暂定解读,而非真实运行轨迹。

  1. 01
    判断

    When to Use

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“When to Use”;未经执行验证。

  2. 02
    操作

    Workflow

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Workflow”;未经执行验证。

  3. 03
    操作

    Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  4. 04
    操作

    Configure network tap: Position the monitoring interface on the SPAN port mirroring the VLAN carrying Modbus TCP traffic between HMI/SCADA servers and PLCs. Verify bidirectional traffic capture with `tcpdump -i eth0 port 502 -c 100 -w modbuscapture.pcap`.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  5. 05
    操作

    Parse Modbus TCP frame structure: Each Modbus TCP frame contains a 7-byte MBAP (Modbus Application Protocol) header followed by the PDU. The MBAP header includes:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  6. 06
    操作

    Transaction Identifier (2 bytes): Matches requests to responses

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

查看全部工作流候选节点 (58 个候选步骤)
  1. 07
    操作

    Protocol Identifier (2 bytes): Always 0x0000 for Modbus

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  2. 08
    操作

    Length (2 bytes): Number of following bytes including Unit ID

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  3. 09
    操作

    Unit Identifier (1 byte): Slave device address (0-247)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  4. 10
    操作

    Extract function codes with Scapy: Use Scapy's Modbus contrib module to dissect captured packets and extract function codes, register addresses, and values:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  5. 11
    输入

    Enable Zeek Modbus logging: Configure Zeek with `@load policy/protocols/modbus/known-masters-slaves` to generate `modbus.log` entries containing timestamp, source/destination IPs, function code, and exception responses. This provides continuous passive logging without custom scripting.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  6. 12
    操作

    Validate frame integrity: Check for malformed Modbus frames where the MBAP length field does not match the actual PDU length, Protocol Identifier is not 0x0000, or Unit Identifier falls outside the expected range for the monitored network.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 1: Capture and Parse Modbus TCP Traffic”;未经执行验证。

  7. 13
    操作

    Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  8. 14
    输入

    Catalog function code distribution: Record the frequency of each function code per source-destination pair over the baseline period. In typical SCADA environments, read operations (FC 01-04) vastly outnumber write operations (FC 05, 06, 15, 16), often at ratios exceeding 100:1. A sudden increase in write function codes is a strong indicator of process manipulation.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  9. 15
    操作

    Map register address ranges: Document which holding register and coil address ranges each master polls. PLCs typically expose specific register blocks for monitoring (e.g., registers 0-99 for process values, 100-199 for setpoints). Access to registers outside the documented range indicates reconnaissance or misconfiguration.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  10. 16
    操作

    Establish timing profiles: Calculate the polling interval (mean, standard deviation) for each master-slave pair. SCADA polling is highly periodic, typically 100ms to 5s intervals. Deviations greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean suggest network issues or injected traffic from a rogue master.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  11. 17
    输入

    Identify authorized masters: Record all IP addresses that initiate Modbus requests (master role). In a properly segmented OT network, only the HMI server and engineering workstation should act as Modbus masters. Any new source IP sending Modbus requests is immediately suspicious.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  12. 18
    操作

    Register value ranges: For critical process registers (temperatures, pressures, flow rates, setpoints), record the observed minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation during normal operations. Values outside the physical process bounds indicate either sensor failure or malicious manipulation.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 2: Baseline Normal Communication Patterns”;未经执行验证。

  13. 19
    操作

    Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  14. 20
    操作

    Apply rule-based and statistical detection to identify suspicious function code usage:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  15. 21
    输入

    Unauthorized write detection: Alert when a Modbus write function code (05, 06, 15, 16) originates from a source IP not in the authorized writers list, or when write operations exceed the baseline frequency threshold:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  16. 22
    输入

    Reconnaissance detection: Function code 43 (Read Device Identification) and function code 08 (Diagnostics) are rarely used during normal operations. Any occurrence from a non-engineering workstation indicates device enumeration. Also detect sequential scanning where a single source queries multiple Unit IDs within a short window.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  17. 23
    操作

    Exception response monitoring: Modbus exception codes (01: Illegal Function, 02: Illegal Data Address, 03: Illegal Data Value) in responses indicate the master sent an invalid request. A burst of exception responses suggests fuzzing or protocol-level attacks:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  18. 24
    输入

    Forbidden function code detection: Some environments prohibit certain function codes entirely. Function codes 07 (Read Exception Status), 08 (Diagnostics), 17 (Report Slave ID), and 43 (Read Device Identification) are diagnostic functions that should not appear in production SCADA traffic. Alert on any occurrence.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  19. 25
    判断

    Function code frequency anomaly: Calculate the chi-squared statistic comparing the observed function code distribution against the baseline distribution. A significant deviation (p < 0.01) triggers an alert even if no individual function code crosses its threshold.

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 3: Detect Function Code Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  20. 26
    操作

    Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  21. 27
    输出

    Setpoint change monitoring: Track all write operations to holding registers that control process setpoints (temperatures, pressures, valve positions, motor speeds). Alert when:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  22. 28
    操作

    The new value exceeds the defined safe operating range

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  23. 29
    输出

    The rate of change exceeds physical process capabilities (e.g., temperature setpoint jumping 50 degrees in one write)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  24. 30
    操作

    Multiple setpoints change simultaneously, which does not match normal operator behavior

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  25. 31
    操作

    Coil state monitoring: Track coil writes (FC 05, FC 15) that control discrete outputs (pumps on/off, valves open/close, breakers trip/close). Detect rapid toggling (more than N state changes per minute) which could indicate equipment damage attempts.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  26. 32
    判断

    Register read pattern anomaly: If a master begins reading register ranges it has never accessed before, this may indicate an attacker using a compromised HMI to map the PLC memory layout before launching a targeted write attack.

    来源描述的决策候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  27. 33
    操作

    Correlation with process data: Where available, compare Modbus register values against independent process sensors (e.g., historian data). Discrepancies between the Modbus-reported value and the independent sensor indicate either sensor spoofing or register manipulation.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 4: Monitor Register Values for Process Manipulation”;未经执行验证。

  28. 34
    操作

    Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  29. 35
    输入

    Rogue master detection: Alert when a new source IP initiates Modbus TCP connections to port 502 on any slave device. Maintain a whitelist of authorized master IPs and generate a critical alert for any connection from an unknown source:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  30. 36
    操作

    Transaction ID anomaly: Modbus TCP uses transaction IDs to match requests with responses. Under normal operation, transaction IDs increment sequentially per master. Detect:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  31. 37
    操作

    Duplicate transaction IDs from different sources (replay attack indicator)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  32. 38
    操作

    Transaction ID gaps or resets (session hijacking indicator)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  33. 39
    操作

    Responses with transaction IDs that do not match any recent request (injected response)

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  34. 40
    操作

    Timing anomaly detection: Calculate inter-packet arrival times for each master-slave pair. Flag deviations greater than 3 standard deviations using a sliding window:

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  35. 41
    操作

    Connection flood detection: Monitor the rate of new TCP connections to port 502 per slave device. Modbus slaves typically handle 1-5 persistent connections. More than 10 connection attempts per minute to a single slave indicates a connection flood DoS or scanning activity.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  36. 42
    操作

    Payload size anomaly: Modbus PDU max size is 253 bytes. Alert on oversized frames that exceed protocol limits, as these may indicate buffer overflow exploitation attempts against vulnerable PLC firmware.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Step 5: Detect Network-Level Anomalies”;未经执行验证。

  37. 43
    操作

    Key Concepts

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Key Concepts”;未经执行验证。

  38. 44
    操作

    Tools & Systems

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Tools & Systems”;未经执行验证。

  39. 45
    操作

    Common Scenarios

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Common Scenarios”;未经执行验证。

  40. 46
    操作

    Deploy a network tap on the OT VLAN switch mirroring all port 502 traffic to the monitoring interface. Run Zeek with Modbus logging and the custom Python analyzer in parallel.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  41. 47
    操作

    Establish a 72-hour baseline during normal operations, cataloging function code distribution, register access patterns, and polling intervals for all six master-slave pairs.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  42. 48
    输入

    Baseline reveals the SCADA server only uses FC 03 (Read Holding Registers) and FC 06 (Write Single Register) to PLC-3 (chemical dosing), with writes occurring 2-4 times per day matching operator shift changes.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  43. 49
    输出

    On day 5, the analyzer detects FC 16 (Write Multiple Registers) from 10.1.1.10 to PLC-3, a function code never seen in the baseline. The write targets registers 40050-40055, which control chlorine dosing rates.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  44. 50
    操作

    Seconds later, a second alert fires: the chlorine dosing setpoint in register 40050 changed from 2.5 mg/L to 25.0 mg/L, exceeding the safe maximum of 4.0 mg/L defined in the register value limits.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  45. 51
    操作

    Cross-referencing with IT network logs reveals the SCADA server was accessed via Remote Desktop from an unauthorized VPN connection 20 minutes before the anomalous Modbus traffic.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  46. 52
    操作

    The operations team is notified, the chemical dosing PLC is placed in manual override, and the incident response team isolates the compromised SCADA server.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Detecting Unauthorized Parameter Manipulation in a Water Treatment Plant”;未经执行验证。

  47. 53
    操作

    Filter Modbus traffic logs for all activity from 10.1.2.20 over the past 24 hours and compare against the baseline communication profile for that workstation.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Identifying Modbus Device Enumeration from a Compromised Engineering Workstation”;未经执行验证。

  48. 54
    操作

    Baseline shows 10.1.2.20 communicates with PLC-1 (10.1.1.50) only during scheduled maintenance windows using FC 03 and FC 06, approximately 200 packets per session.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Identifying Modbus Device Enumeration from a Compromised Engineering Workstation”;未经执行验证。

  49. 55
    输入

    Anomaly detection identifies 10.1.2.20 sent FC 43 (Read Device Identification) to 15 different IP addresses on the OT VLAN within a 10-minute window, none of which it has previously communicated with.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Identifying Modbus Device Enumeration from a Compromised Engineering Workstation”;未经执行验证。

  50. 56
    输入

    Further analysis shows FC 03 read requests to register ranges 0-9999 in blocks of 125 registers per request, systematically mapping the entire register space of each PLC contacted.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Identifying Modbus Device Enumeration from a Compromised Engineering Workstation”;未经执行验证。

  51. 57
    操作

    The engineering workstation is isolated, forensic imaging initiated, and all Modbus communication from that IP is blocked at the OT firewall. The device identification responses captured reveal the PLC firmware versions that the attacker obtained.

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Scenario: Identifying Modbus Device Enumeration from a Compromised Engineering Workstation”;未经执行验证。

  52. 58
    输出

    Output Format

    来源描述的步骤候选,位于“Output Format”;未经执行验证。

潜在风险面

静态发现用于提示安装前需要检查的位置,不能证明一项技能安全、恶意或有效。

有需要复核的项目

收集的文本中有 57 项确定性词法发现需要复核。发现可能仅位于文档中,不证明已执行或可被利用;仅含二进制的文件未扫描。

网络访问已观察到
文件写入已观察到
凭据使用未观察到
提示

文本描述或实现了文件修改

55 次命中

此行包含可能的文件写入或重定向操作。应检查目标路径和覆盖行为;静态审查没有写入任何文件。 该规则在收集文本中命中 55 处;此处列出 3 个代表位置。命中文本可能只是文档,分析器没有执行它。

上下文可能消耗在哪里

发现、激活与资源层具有不同含义。只有使用指定官方方法并记录模型的运行时,才显示精确数值。

精确 token 计数不可用

在管线使用明确模型执行官方精确计数之前,包括文件清单在内的所有 token 值均为 null。

未使用要求的官方方法记录 token 测量。本档案不会用字符数、文件大小或估计值替代。

受控评估

没有受控评估

该技能仅具备以上标明的证据。不声称任何任务成功率、token 效率、延迟或质量优势。

尚未测试

在源码可见的情况下使用

安装命令
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

前置条件

  • 静态分析无法评估运行时行为、命令是否成功、网络可达性或模型输出质量。
  • 未执行任何命令、脚本、网络请求、模型调用或受控技能测试。
  • 类别、标签、能力、工作流程和双语编辑摘要均为待人工复核的确定性候选,并非已验证结果。
  • 在后续管线实际执行并记录官方模型专用计数之前,无法提供精确 token 数。

示例提示词

未提供

附上限制条件的判断

优势

  • 快照包含 4 个收集文件、2 个 Markdown 文件和 1 个脚本文件,可进行源代码级检查。[证据:skills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies/SKILL.md:L1]

注意事项

  • 尚未确立功能、安全或模型质量结果。安装或发布前,人工复核必须检查源代码上下文和所有引用发现。
研究结论

仅为暂定的确定性静态清单;等待人工编辑复核以及独立的受控评估。不构成安装建议、安全保证或有效性声明。

从结构上保持可追溯

档案是对公开工件的限时阅读,而非背书。请通过来源链接检查确切的上游材料。

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/monitoring-scada-modbus-traffic-anomalies
来源类型
社区
提交
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
采集时间
2026年11月20日
最近核查
2026年11月20日
上游许可证
Apache-2.0
仓库星标
36,446
内容依据

仅对提供的文件进行确定性词法解析、YAML frontmatter 校验、文件清单、来源描述的工作流程提取和启发式暂定分类。由机器生成;无 LLM、执行、动态测试或人工编辑批准。