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Skill dossier

securing-aws-iam-permissions

Source declaration

Hardens AWS IAM configurations to enforce least-privilege access, covering IAM policy scoping, permission boundaries, IAM Access Analyzer integration, and credential rotation strategies. Use when reducing the blast radius of compromised AWS identities, auditing overly permissive IAM policies, or setting up permission boundaries and Access Analyzer findings review across cloud accounts.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Hardens AWS IAM configurations to enforce least-privilege access, covering IAM policy scoping, permission boundaries, IAM Access Analyzer integration, and credential rotation strategies. Use when reducing the blast radius of compromised AWS identities, auditing overly permissive IAM policies, or setting up permission boundaries and Access Analyzer findings review across cloud accounts.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Hardens AWS IAM configurations to enforce least-privilege access, covering IAM policy scoping, permission boundaries, IAM Access Analyzer integration, and credential rotation strategies. Use when reducing the blast radius of compromised AWS identities, auditing overly permissive IAM policies, or setting up permission boundaries and Access Analyzer findings review across cloud accounts. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L79]
  • Step 1: Inventory Existing IAM Entities and Policies [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L81]
  • Step 2: Enable and Analyze IAM Access Analyzer Findings [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L101]
  • Step 3: Scope Policies to Specific Resources and Conditions [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L128]
  • Step 4: Implement Permission Boundaries [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L157]
  • Step 5: Enforce MFA and Eliminate Long-Lived Credentials [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L206]
  • Step 6: Automate Continuous IAM Monitoring [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L240]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L1-L58]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
33.7 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/references/api-reference.mdReference2.3 KB
skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/scripts/agent.pyScript7.5 KB
skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.mdInstruction12.9 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "securing-aws-iam-permissions",
  "description": "Hardens AWS IAM configurations to enforce least-privilege access, covering IAM policy scoping, permission boundaries, IAM Access Analyzer integration, and credential rotation strategies. Use when reducing the blast radius of compromised AWS identities, auditing overly permissive IAM policies, or setting up permission boundaries and Access Analyzer findings review across cloud accounts.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "cloud-security",
  "tags": [
    "aws-iam",
    "least-privilege",
    "permission-boundaries",
    "access-analyzer",
    "cloud-identity"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.IR-01",
    "ID.AM-08",
    "GV.SC-06",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1078.004",
    "T1530",
    "T1537",
    "T1580",
    "T1003"
  ],
  "mitre_f3": {
    "version": "1.1",
    "tactics": [
      "initial-access",
      "positioning"
    ],
    "techniques": [
      {
        "id": "F1006.001",
        "name": "Account Takeover: Exposed API Key",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      },
      {
        "id": "F1006.002",
        "name": "Account Takeover: Exposed Login Credential",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1550.001",
        "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1110.003",
        "name": "Brute Force: Password Spraying",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "F1005.004",
        "name": "Account Manipulation: Change Account Details",
        "tactic": "positioning",
        "source": "f3"
      }
    ]
  }
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Inventory Existing IAM Entities and Policies

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Inventory Existing IAM Entities and Policies”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Generate a comprehensive inventory of all IAM users, roles, groups, and attached policies using the AWS CLI and IAM credential reports. Identify accounts with console access, programmatic access keys, and their last-used timestamps.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Inventory Existing IAM Entities and Policies”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 2: Enable and Analyze IAM Access Analyzer Findings

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Enable and Analyze IAM Access Analyzer Findings”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 3: Scope Policies to Specific Resources and Conditions

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Scope Policies to Specific Resources and Conditions”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (23 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 4: Implement Permission Boundaries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Implement Permission Boundaries”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 5: Enforce MFA and Eliminate Long-Lived Credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Enforce MFA and Eliminate Long-Lived Credentials”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 6: Automate Continuous IAM Monitoring

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Automate Continuous IAM Monitoring”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Enable IAM Access Analyzer and generate policy recommendations based on 90 days of CloudTrail data for each role

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Developer Role Over-Provisioned with AdministratorAccess”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Create scoped policies allowing only the specific S3 buckets, Lambda functions, and DynamoDB tables each team accesses

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Developer Role Over-Provisioned with AdministratorAccess”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Attach a permission boundary denying IAM, Organizations, and billing actions

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Developer Role Over-Provisioned with AdministratorAccess”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Deploy the new policies in a parallel role with CloudTrail monitoring before replacing the original

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Developer Role Over-Provisioned with AdministratorAccess”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Remove AdministratorAccess and rotate all access keys

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Developer Role Over-Provisioned with AdministratorAccess”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Immediately deactivate the compromised key using `aws iam update-access-key --status Inactive`

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Rotating Compromised Access Keys Across Multiple Services”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Review CloudTrail logs for all API calls made with the compromised key in the past 30 days

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Rotating Compromised Access Keys Across Multiple Services”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Create a new access key for the user and update all dependent services and CI/CD pipelines

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Rotating Compromised Access Keys Across Multiple Services”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Delete the compromised key after confirming all services use the new credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Rotating Compromised Access Keys Across Multiple Services”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Migrate the workload to use IAM roles with STS temporary credentials to prevent future key exposure

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Rotating Compromised Access Keys Across Multiple Services”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

10 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

5 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 5 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

5 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 5 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/securing-aws-iam-permissions/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/securing-aws-iam-permissions
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.