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Skill dossier

reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx

Source declaration

Reverse engineers malicious Android APK files using the JADX decompiler to read Java/Kotlin source, inspect manifest permissions, receivers, services, and native libraries, and identify data theft, C2 communication, privilege escalation, or overlay-attack behavior. Use when analyzing a suspected Android banking trojan, spyware, SMS stealer, or other flagged APK, or when investigating mobile malware or Android threats generally.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Reverse engineers malicious Android APK files using the JADX decompiler to read Java/Kotlin source, inspect manifest permissions, receivers, services, and native libraries, and identify data theft, C2 communication, privilege escalation, or overlay-attack behavior. Use when analyzing a suspected Android banking trojan, spyware, SMS stealer, or other flagged APK, or when investigating mobile malware or Android threats generally.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Reverse engineers malicious Android APK files using the JADX decompiler to read Java/Kotlin source, inspect manifest permissions, receivers, services, and native libraries, and identify data theft, C2 communication, privilege escalation, or overlay-attack behavior. Use when analyzing a suspected Android banking trojan, spyware, SMS stealer, or other flagged APK, or when investigating mobile malware or Android threats generally. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Extract APK Metadata and Permissions [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Decompile with JADX [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L121]
  • Step 3: Identify Malicious Functionality [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L153]
  • Step 4: Analyze C2 Communication [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L183]
  • Step 5: Examine Native Libraries [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L237]
  • Step 6: Document Analysis and Extract IOCs [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L259]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L1-L33]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
33.6 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/references/api-reference.mdReference2.4 KB
skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/scripts/agent.pyScript7.6 KB
skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.mdInstruction12.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx",
  "description": "Reverse engineers malicious Android APK files using the JADX decompiler to read Java/Kotlin source, inspect manifest permissions, receivers, services, and native libraries, and identify data theft, C2 communication, privilege escalation, or overlay-attack behavior. Use when analyzing a suspected Android banking trojan, spyware, SMS stealer, or other flagged APK, or when investigating mobile malware or Android threats generally.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "malware-analysis",
  "tags": [
    "malware",
    "Android",
    "reverse-engineering",
    "JADX",
    "mobile-malware"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.AE-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "ID.RA-01",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1027",
    "T1055",
    "T1140",
    "T1497",
    "T1068"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Extract APK Metadata and Permissions

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Extract APK Metadata and Permissions”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 2: Decompile with JADX

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Decompile with JADX”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 3: Identify Malicious Functionality

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Identify Malicious Functionality”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 4: Analyze C2 Communication

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze C2 Communication”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (20 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 5: Examine Native Libraries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Examine Native Libraries”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Check for native code that may contain additional malicious logic:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Examine Native Libraries”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 6: Document Analysis and Extract IOCs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Document Analysis and Extract IOCs”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Extract APK metadata and identify requested permissions (SMS, accessibility, overlay, device admin)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Decompile with JADX and search for overlay activity classes that mimic banking app UIs

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Identify the list of targeted banking apps by searching for package name lists in the code

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Trace the SMS interception receiver to understand how 2FA codes are stolen

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Follow the C2 communication code to extract server URLs and command protocol

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Check for web injection configuration files in assets/ directory

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Extract all IOCs and document the complete attack chain

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Analyzing an Android Banking Trojan”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

19 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

4 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 4 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

14 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 14 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Dynamic command execution is referenced

A shell, dynamic evaluation, or process execution primitive appears here. Inspect arguments and input control. Presence in source does not prove a command ran. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/reverse-engineering-android-malware-with-jadx
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.