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Skill dossier

performing-insider-threat-investigation

Source declaration

Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies, combining digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Use when DLP alerts flag large data transfers to personal cloud storage or USB devices, when UBA detects anomalous access patterns for a user account, or when investigating employee data theft, privilege misuse, or internal threat detection requests.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies, combining digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Use when DLP alerts flag large data transfers to personal cloud storage or USB devices, when UBA detects anomalous access patterns for a user account, or when investigating employee data theft, privilege misuse, or internal threat detection requests.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies, combining digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Use when DLP alerts flag large data transfers to personal cloud storage or USB devices, when UBA detects anomalous access patterns for a user account, or when investigating employee data theft, privilege misuse, or internal threat detection requests. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L60]
  • Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L83]
  • Step 3: Analyze User Behavior Patterns [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L107]
  • Step 4: Reconstruct the Activity Timeline [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L132]
  • Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L149]
  • Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L167]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L1-L34]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
32.8 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/references/api-reference.mdReference1.9 KB
skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/scripts/agent.pyScript8.7 KB
skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.mdInstruction11.3 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "performing-insider-threat-investigation",
  "description": "Investigates insider threat incidents involving employees, contractors, or trusted partners who misuse authorized access to steal data, sabotage systems, or violate security policies, combining digital forensics, user behavior analytics, and HR/legal coordination to build an evidence-based case. Use when DLP alerts flag large data transfers to personal cloud storage or USB devices, when UBA detects anomalous access patterns for a user account, or when investigating employee data theft, privilege misuse, or internal threat detection requests.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "incident-response",
  "tags": [
    "insider-threat",
    "user-behavior-analytics",
    "data-exfiltration",
    "privilege-misuse",
    "DFIR"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1486",
    "T1490",
    "T1070",
    "T1078",
    "T1048"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "RS.MA-01",
    "RS.MA-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "RC.RP-01"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Input

    Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Input

    Record the source of the allegation (DLP alert, UBA detection, HR referral, manager report)

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Confirm with legal counsel that the investigation is authorized

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Define the investigation scope: what activity is being investigated, time period, systems involved

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (53 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Establish the investigation team: security, legal, HR (never investigate alone)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Create a restricted case file accessible only to the investigation team

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Receive and Validate the Allegation”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    DLP logs: file transfers, policy violations, content matches

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Cloud access logs: SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive activity

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Email logs: messages to personal accounts, large attachments, forwarding rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    VPN and authentication logs: access times, locations, devices

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Badge access logs: physical access patterns

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Print logs: large print jobs of sensitive documents

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    USB device connection logs: device type, serial number, connection times

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Decision

    Screen capture or session recording (only if legally authorized and documented)

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Keystroke logging (jurisdiction-dependent, requires explicit legal approval)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Network traffic capture for the subject's workstation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Create forensic image of the subject's workstation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Analyze browser history, download history, and installed applications

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Examine deleted files and Recycle Bin contents

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Review cloud sync application logs (Dropbox, Google Drive desktop client)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Collect Evidence Covertly”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Step 3: Analyze User Behavior Patterns

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Analyze User Behavior Patterns”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Step 4: Reconstruct the Activity Timeline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Reconstruct the Activity Timeline”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    What data was accessed or exfiltrated (classification level, business impact)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Was the data shared externally (competitors, public, personal storage)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Output

    Regulatory implications (PII, PHI, financial data, export-controlled)

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Contractual implications (NDA violations, IP assignment agreements)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Potential financial damage to the organization

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Confront the subject with evidence during an interview (HR-led)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Terminate employment and revoke all access immediately

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Pursue civil litigation for breach of NDA or trade secret theft

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Refer to law enforcement for criminal prosecution (theft of trade secrets, CFAA violation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Output

    Negotiate a settlement with return/destruction of data

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Assess Impact and Determine Response”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Maintain strict chain of custody for all physical and digital evidence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Document all analysis steps in detail (reproducible by another examiner)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Hash all evidence files and maintain an integrity log

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Store evidence in a secure, access-controlled repository with audit logging

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Retain evidence per legal hold requirements (do not destroy during active investigation or litigation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Preserve Evidence for Legal Proceedings”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Obtain legal authorization to investigate before taking any action

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Pull Git access logs showing repository clones and downloads for the past 60 days

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Review DLP logs for USB device connections and large file transfers

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Check email gateway for messages with code attachments sent to personal accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Action

    Analyze browser history for personal cloud storage uploads

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Action

    Image the workstation forensically before the employee's last day

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  46. 52
    Output

    Present findings to legal and HR for determination of next steps

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Departing Engineer Exfiltrating Source Code”; not verified execution.

  47. 53
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

23 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

6 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 6 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

17 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 17 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/performing-insider-threat-investigation/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/performing-insider-threat-investigation
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.