Back to catalog
Static reviewDevelopment

Skill dossier

performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection

Source declaration

Detect and respond to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks that use reverse proxy kits like EvilProxy, Evilginx, and Tycoon 2FA to bypass MFA and steal session tokens, correlating Azure AD/Entra sign-in logs, SIEM alerts, and EDR telemetry. Use when investigating suspected MFA-bypass phishing or session token theft, or building detection and response playbooks against reverse-proxy phishing kits.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect and respond to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks that use reverse proxy kits like EvilProxy, Evilginx, and Tycoon 2FA to bypass MFA and steal session tokens, correlating Azure AD/Entra sign-in logs, SIEM alerts, and EDR telemetry. Use when investigating suspected MFA-bypass phishing or session token theft, or building detection and response playbooks against reverse-proxy phishing kits.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect and respond to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks that use reverse proxy kits like EvilProxy, Evilginx, and Tycoon 2FA to bypass MFA and steal session tokens, correlating Azure AD/Entra sign-in logs, SIEM alerts, and EDR telemetry. Use when investigating suspected MFA-bypass phishing or session token theft, or building detection and response playbooks against reverse-proxy phishing kits. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L112]
  • Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L114]
  • Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L121]
  • Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L128]
  • Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L135]
  • Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L142]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L1-L64]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
8
Markdown files
5
scripts
2
references
4
Size
42.6 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/assets/template.mdReference1.3 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/references/api-reference.mdReference2.7 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/references/standards.mdReference1.4 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/references/workflows.mdReference1.9 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/scripts/agent.pyScript6.9 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/scripts/process.pyScript10.8 KB
skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.mdInstruction6.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection",
  "description": "Detect and respond to Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks that use reverse proxy kits like EvilProxy, Evilginx, and Tycoon 2FA to bypass MFA and steal session tokens, correlating Azure AD/Entra sign-in logs, SIEM alerts, and EDR telemetry. Use when investigating suspected MFA-bypass phishing or session token theft, or building detection and response playbooks against reverse-proxy phishing kits.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "phishing-defense",
  "tags": [
    "aitm",
    "evilproxy",
    "evilginx",
    "phishing",
    "mfa-bypass",
    "session-hijacking",
    "reverse-proxy",
    "credential-theft"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.AT-01",
    "DE.CM-09",
    "RS.CO-02",
    "DE.AE-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1566",
    "T1598",
    "T1534",
    "T1036",
    "T1003"
  ],
  "mitre_f3": {
    "version": "1.1",
    "tactics": [
      "initial-access",
      "positioning"
    ],
    "techniques": [
      {
        "id": "T1557",
        "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1660",
        "name": "Phishing",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "F1004",
        "name": "Access with Stolen Session Cookie",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1539",
        "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie",
        "tactic": "positioning",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1185",
        "name": "Browser Session Hijacking",
        "tactic": "positioning",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "F1006",
        "name": "Account Takeover",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      }
    ]
  }
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Victim receives phishing email with link to attacker-controlled domain

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Attacker domain runs reverse proxy that mirrors legitimate login page

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Victim enters credentials on proxied page; credentials captured in transit

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (43 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Reverse proxy forwards credentials to real authentication service

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    MFA challenge sent to victim; victim completes MFA on proxied page

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Attacker captures session cookie returned by legitimate service

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Attacker replays session cookie to access victim's account without MFA

    Source-described action candidate under “How AiTM Works”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Implement FIDO2 security keys or Windows Hello for Business for high-value accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Configure Conditional Access to require phishing-resistant MFA for admins

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Enable certificate-based authentication where possible

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Disable SMS and voice MFA for privileged accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    AiTM cannot intercept FIDO2 because authentication is bound to origin domain

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Deploy Phishing-Resistant MFA”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Require compliant/managed device for sensitive application access

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Block authentication from anonymous proxies and Tor exit nodes

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Enforce token binding to limit session cookie replay

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Configure continuous access evaluation (CAE) for real-time token revocation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Implement sign-in risk policies that require re-authentication for risky sign-ins

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Conditional Access Policies”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Alert on sign-in followed by session from different IP within 10 minutes

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Detect authentication where proxy IP does not match user's expected location

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Monitor for impossible travel patterns in session usage

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Alert on inbox rules created immediately after authentication (common post-compromise)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Detect new MFA method registration from suspicious sign-in

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build AiTM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Log and analyze DNS queries to newly registered domains

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Detect connections to known PhaaS infrastructure IPs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Alert on authentication page backgrounds loaded from legitimate CDNs through proxy domains

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Monitor for SSL certificates issued to domains mimicking corporate login pages

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Block access to known EvilProxy/Evilginx infrastructure via threat intelligence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Monitor Web Proxy for AiTM Infrastructure”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Alert on mailbox forwarding rules created after suspicious authentication

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Detect OAuth app consent after AiTM sign-in

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Monitor for email sending patterns indicating BEC follow-up

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Alert on SharePoint/OneDrive mass download after session hijack

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Track lateral movement from compromised account

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Implement Post-Compromise Detection”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Tools & Resources

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Resources”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Validation

    Source-described action candidate under “Validation”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

20 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

3 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 3 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

17 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 17 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 8 collected file(s), 5 Markdown file(s), and 2 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/performing-adversary-in-the-middle-phishing-detection
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.