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Skill dossier

hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement

Source declaration

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L74]
  • Step 1: Understand DCOM Lateral Movement Attack Vectors [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L76]
  • Step 2: Configure Sysmon for DCOM Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L111]
  • Step 3: Build SIEM Detection Rules for DCOM Object Abuse [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L179]
  • Step 4: Deploy Splunk and KQL Detection Queries [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L295]
  • Step 5: WMI Event Correlation for DCOM Activity [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L404]
  • Step 6: Network-Level DCOM Detection with Zeek [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L453]
  • Step 7: DCOM Attack Surface Audit and Hardening [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L528]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L1-L44]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
5
Markdown files
2
scripts
2
references
1
Size
77.9 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/references/api-reference.mdReference5.6 KB
skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/scripts/agent.pyScript13.7 KB
skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/scripts/detect_dcom_lateral_movement.pyScript18.5 KB
skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.mdInstruction29.1 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement",
  "description": "Hunt for DCOM-based lateral movement (MITRE ATT&CK T1021.003) by detecting abuse of MMC20.Application, ShellBrowserWindow, and ShellWindows COM objects via Sysmon Event ID 1/3 correlation, WMI event analysis, and RPC endpoint mapper traffic on port 135. Use when investigating suspicious mmc.exe/dllhost.exe child processes, building T1021.003 detections, or auditing DCOM exposure during purple-team exercises.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "DCOM",
    "lateral-movement",
    "T1021.003",
    "Sysmon",
    "MMC20",
    "ShellWindows",
    "ShellBrowserWindow",
    "COM-objects",
    "WMI",
    "RPC"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1021"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 1: Understand DCOM Lateral Movement Attack Vectors

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand DCOM Lateral Movement Attack Vectors”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 2: Configure Sysmon for DCOM Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Sysmon for DCOM Detection”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 3: Build SIEM Detection Rules for DCOM Object Abuse

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Build SIEM Detection Rules for DCOM Object Abuse”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (26 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 4: Deploy Splunk and KQL Detection Queries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Deploy Splunk and KQL Detection Queries”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 5: WMI Event Correlation for DCOM Activity

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: WMI Event Correlation for DCOM Activity”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 6: Network-Level DCOM Detection with Zeek

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Network-Level DCOM Detection with Zeek”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 7: DCOM Attack Surface Audit and Hardening

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: DCOM Attack Surface Audit and Hardening”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Query Sysmon Event ID 1 on 10.10.20.50: confirm mmc.exe (parent: svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch) spawned cmd.exe with command line `/c net user /domain > C:\temp\users.txt`

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Query Sysmon Event ID 3 on 10.10.20.50: identify inbound TCP connection on port 135 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:01, followed by a high-port connection at 03:22:02

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Correlate Event ID 4624 on 10.10.20.50: find LogonType 3 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:00 with admin credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Investigate 10.10.5.30: check for compromise indicators -- find Mimikatz artifacts in memory, evidence of credential dumping at 03:15

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Trace the attack chain: initial phishing compromise at 02:45, credential theft at 03:15, DCOM lateral movement at 03:22

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Contain: isolate 10.10.5.30 and 10.10.20.50, force password reset for compromised admin account, block inbound RPC from non-admin subnets

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Verify no interactive sessions: query Event ID 4624 LogonType 2 or 10 on DC01 -- none found during the time window

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Query Sysmon Event ID 1: explorer.exe spawning cmd.exe with encoded PowerShell commands at 14:05, 14:12, and 14:18

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Decode the PowerShell: reveals reconnaissance commands (Get-ADUser, Get-ADGroup, Get-ADComputer)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Query Sysmon Event ID 3: inbound RPC connections from 10.10.3.15 preceding each process creation

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Identify the ShellWindows pattern: no new mmc.exe or dllhost.exe process created -- commands execute through existing explorer.exe, consistent with ShellWindows/ShellBrowserWindow DCOM abuse

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Investigate 10.10.3.15: compromised workstation with Cobalt Strike beacon artifacts

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

60 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

15 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

45 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 45 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 5 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 2 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/hunting-for-dcom-lateral-movement
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.