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Skill dossier

hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition

Source declaration

Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L75]
  • Step 1: Identify and mount the ESP read-only [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L77]
  • Step 2: Detect anomalous top-level entries (high-fidelity hunt) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L92]
  • Step 3: Inventory and hash every EFI binary [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L102]
  • Step 4: Verify Secure Boot signatures on each loader [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L116]
  • Step 5: Compare against the golden baseline [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L131]
  • Step 6: YARA-scan ESP binaries for bootkit signatures [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L143]
  • Step 7: Inspect and validate UEFI boot entries [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L154]
  • Step 8: Validate measured boot against TPM PCRs (where available) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L166]
  • Step 9: Document findings and preserve evidence [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L177]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L1-L22]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
5
Markdown files
3
scripts
1
references
2
Size
33.5 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/references/api-reference.mdReference2.7 KB
skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/references/standards.mdReference1.4 KB
skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/scripts/agent.pyScript6 KB
skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.mdInstruction12.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition",
  "description": "Baseline the EFI System Partition and hunt malicious EFI binaries such as ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, and Glupteba by mounting the ESP, hashing and verifying boot loaders, scanning with YARA, and flagging anomalous non-EFI files or out-of-band bootloader changes. Use during proactive threat hunts for firmware/bootkit persistence (MITRE ATT&CK T1542.003) or when investigating suspected UEFI-level compromise that survives OS reinstall.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "hardware-firmware-security",
  "tags": [
    "bootkit",
    "uefi",
    "efi-system-partition",
    "secure-boot",
    "firmware-forensics",
    "threat-hunting",
    "yara",
    "measured-boot"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1542.003"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Objectives

    Source-described action candidate under “Objectives”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Source-described action candidate under “MITRE ATT&CK Mapping”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Input

    Step 1: Identify and mount the ESP read-only

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 1: Identify and mount the ESP read-only”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (18 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 2: Detect anomalous top-level entries (high-fidelity hunt)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Detect anomalous top-level entries (high-fidelity hunt)”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 3: Inventory and hash every EFI binary

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Inventory and hash every EFI binary”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 4: Verify Secure Boot signatures on each loader

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Verify Secure Boot signatures on each loader”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 5: Compare against the golden baseline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Compare against the golden baseline”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 6: YARA-scan ESP binaries for bootkit signatures

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: YARA-scan ESP binaries for bootkit signatures”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Run YARA rules for known bootkits (ESPecter, BlackLotus, Bootkitty, CosmicStrand) across the ESP — the same approach as Velociraptor's `Windows.Detection.Yara.UEFI`.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: YARA-scan ESP binaries for bootkit signatures”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Step 7: Inspect and validate UEFI boot entries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: Inspect and validate UEFI boot entries”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Step 8: Validate measured boot against TPM PCRs (where available)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 8: Validate measured boot against TPM PCRs (where available)”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Step 9: Document findings and preserve evidence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 9: Document findings and preserve evidence”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Tools and Resources

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools and Resources”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Known Bootkit Indicators

    Source-described action candidate under “Known Bootkit Indicators”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Validation Criteria

    Source-described action candidate under “Validation Criteria”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

47 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

17 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 17 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

15 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Elevated privileges are referenced

15 occurrences

Privilege-elevation syntax is present. Confirm whether elevation is necessary and inspect every operation performed under it; static analysis cannot prove that elevation succeeded. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 5 collected file(s), 3 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/hunting-bootkits-in-efi-system-partition
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.