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Skill dossier

exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse

Source declaration

Exploits Kerberos Constrained Delegation misconfigurations in Active Directory using Impacket's findDelegation.py and getST.py (or Rubeus/Kekeo on Windows) to abuse S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy and impersonate privileged users. Use during authorized Active Directory penetration tests or red-team engagements for lateral movement and privilege escalation after finding an account trusted for constrained delegation.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Exploits Kerberos Constrained Delegation misconfigurations in Active Directory using Impacket's findDelegation.py and getST.py (or Rubeus/Kekeo on Windows) to abuse S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy and impersonate privileged users. Use during authorized Active Directory penetration tests or red-team engagements for lateral movement and privilege escalation after finding an account trusted for constrained delegation.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Exploits Kerberos Constrained Delegation misconfigurations in Active Directory using Impacket's findDelegation.py and getST.py (or Rubeus/Kekeo on Windows) to abuse S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy and impersonate privileged users. Use during authorized Active Directory penetration tests or red-team engagements for lateral movement and privilege escalation after finding an account trusted for constrained delegation. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md:L81]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md:L1-L39]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
6
Markdown files
4
scripts
1
references
3
Size
27.9 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/references/api-reference.mdReference2.2 KB
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/references/standards.mdReference847 B
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/references/workflows.mdReference723 B
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/scripts/agent.pyScript4.4 KB
skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/SKILL.mdInstruction8.9 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse",
  "description": "Exploits Kerberos Constrained Delegation misconfigurations in Active Directory using Impacket's findDelegation.py and getST.py (or Rubeus/Kekeo on Windows) to abuse S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy and impersonate privileged users. Use during authorized Active Directory penetration tests or red-team engagements for lateral movement and privilege escalation after finding an account trusted for constrained delegation.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "red-teaming",
  "tags": [
    "red-team",
    "active-directory",
    "kerberos",
    "constrained-delegation",
    "s4u2proxy",
    "privilege-escalation",
    "lateral-movement"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1595",
    "T1190",
    "T1059",
    "T1078",
    "T1021"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Objectives

    Source-described action candidate under “Objectives”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Source-described action candidate under “MITRE ATT&CK Mapping”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Find accounts with Constrained Delegation using PowerView:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 1: Enumerate Constrained Delegation”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (20 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Using Impacket findDelegation.py:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 1: Enumerate Constrained Delegation”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Using BloodHound CE:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 1: Enumerate Constrained Delegation”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Check for the TRUSTEDTOAUTHFORDELEGATION flag (protocol transition):

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 1: Enumerate Constrained Delegation”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Decision

    If you have the password or hash of the constrained delegation account:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Phase 2: Exploit with Rubeus (Windows)”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Combined TGT request and S4U in single command:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 2: Exploit with Rubeus (Windows)”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Request service ticket via S4U protocol extensions:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 3: Exploit with Impacket (Linux)”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Kerberos service tickets are not validated against the SPN in the ticket, allowing SPN substitution:

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 4: Alternate Service Name Abuse”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    This technique works because the service name in the ticket is not cryptographically bound to the session key

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 4: Alternate Service Name Abuse”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Decision

    If the account has TRUSTEDTOAUTHFORDELEGATION:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Phase 5: Protocol Transition Attack”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Without TRUSTEDTOAUTHFORDELEGATION, S4U2self tickets are non-forwardable and S4U2proxy will fail (unless using Resource-Based Constrained Delegation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Phase 5: Protocol Transition Attack”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Tools and Resources

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools and Resources”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Delegation Types Comparison

    Source-described action candidate under “Delegation Types Comparison”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Detection Signatures

    Source-described action candidate under “Detection Signatures”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Validation Criteria

    Source-described action candidate under “Validation Criteria”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

16 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useObserved
Medium

Network access is mentioned

5 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 5 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

10 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 10 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Credential or secret material is referenced

This line resembles a credential literal or reads a sensitive environment value. Do not expose its contents; verify whether it is a placeholder, required secret, or accidentally committed material. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 6 collected file(s), 4 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/exploiting-constrained-delegation-abuse
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.