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Skill dossier

escaping-containers-to-host

Source declaration

Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L88]
  • Step 1: Enumerate the Container Environment [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L90]
  • Step 2: Escape via a Privileged Container (cgroup releaseagent) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L116]
  • Step 3: Escape via a Mounted Docker Socket [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L146]
  • Step 4: Escape via a hostPath Mount (Kubernetes) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L169]
  • Step 5: Exploit runC CVE-2024-21626 (Leaky Vessels fd leak) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L197]
  • Step 6: Exploit the 2025 runC procfs Write-Redirect Family [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L221]
  • Step 7: Validate the Patched State and Document Remediation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L241]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L1-L29]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
5
Markdown files
3
scripts
1
references
2
Size
35.7 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/escaping-containers-to-host/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/escaping-containers-to-host/references/api-reference.mdReference2.5 KB
skills/escaping-containers-to-host/references/standards.mdReference2.3 KB
skills/escaping-containers-to-host/scripts/agent.pyScript6.7 KB
skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.mdInstruction13.3 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "escaping-containers-to-host",
  "description": "Exploits privileged pods, host mounts, runC CVEs, and exposed Docker sockets to break out of a container and reach the underlying host during an authorized container-security assessment. Use when executing an approved breakout test, demonstrating the real impact of a privileged or hostPath workload, or validating that escape mitigations actually hold. Keywords: container breakout, privileged, hostPath, docker.sock, runC CVE-2019-5736, CVE-2024-21626, release_agent, nsenter. Do not use for defensive detection of these techniques - use detecting-container-escape-attempts.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "container-security",
  "tags": [
    "container-escape",
    "privileged-container",
    "runc-cve",
    "docker-socket",
    "host-mount",
    "kubernetes",
    "privilege-escalation",
    "breakout"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.PS-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1611"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Misconfiguration escapes — privileged containers, `CAPSYSADMIN`, host PID/IPC/Network namespaces, and `hostPath` mounts.

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Exposed Docker socket (`/var/run/docker.sock`) — mounting the daemon socket into a container hands an attacker root on the host via a new privileged container.

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    The "Leaky Vessels" runC fd leak, CVE-2024-21626 — runC leaks an internal file descriptor (`/proc/self/fd/7`/`8`) referencing the host filesystem before `pivotroot`; setting the container working directory to that fd lands the process on the host. Patched in runC 1.1.12 (containerd 1.6.28/1.7.13, Docker 25.0.2).

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Input

    The November 2025 runC procfs write-redirect family — CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, CVE-2025-52881 — race/symlink abuse of the `/dev/null`, `/dev/console`, and other bind mounts performed before runC applies `maskedPaths`/`readonlyPaths`, allowing read-write access to `/proc` entries (e.g. `/proc/sysrq-trigger`, `corepattern`) and arbitrary write redirection. Patched in runC 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.

    Source-described input candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (21 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Objectives

    Source-described action candidate under “Objectives”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Source-described action candidate under “MITRE ATT&CK Mapping”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 1: Enumerate the Container Environment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Enumerate the Container Environment”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 2: Escape via a Privileged Container (cgroup releaseagent)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Escape via a Privileged Container (cgroup release_agent)”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Step 3: Escape via a Mounted Docker Socket

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Escape via a Mounted Docker Socket”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Decision

    If `/var/run/docker.sock` is bind-mounted into the container, you control the host Docker daemon and can launch a new container that mounts the host root.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Escape via a Mounted Docker Socket”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Step 4: Escape via a hostPath Mount (Kubernetes)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Escape via a hostPath Mount (Kubernetes)”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Step 5: Exploit runC CVE-2024-21626 (Leaky Vessels fd leak)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Exploit runC CVE-2024-21626 (Leaky Vessels fd leak)”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Decision

    If the runtime is runC <= 1.1.11, the leaked host-cwd fd can be used. With `docker build`/`docker run` control, set the working directory to `/proc/self/fd/<N>` (commonly 7 or 8).

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Exploit runC CVE-2024-21626 (Leaky Vessels fd leak)”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Output

    Step 6: Exploit the 2025 runC procfs Write-Redirect Family

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 6: Exploit the 2025 runC procfs Write-Redirect Family”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Step 7: Validate the Patched State and Document Remediation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: Validate the Patched State and Document Remediation”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Tools and Resources

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools and Resources”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Escape Primitive Reference

    Source-described action candidate under “Escape Primitive Reference”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Validation Criteria

    Source-described action candidate under “Validation Criteria”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

78 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

29 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 29 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

49 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 49 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 5 collected file(s), 3 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/escaping-containers-to-host/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/escaping-containers-to-host
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.