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Skill dossier

detecting-process-injection-techniques

Source declaration

Detects and analyzes process injection techniques used by malware including classic DLL injection, process hollowing, APC injection, thread hijacking, and reflective loading. Uses memory forensics, API monitoring, and behavioral analysis to identify injection artifacts. Activates for requests involving process injection detection, code injection analysis, hollowed process investigation, or in-memory threat detection.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detects and analyzes process injection techniques used by malware including classic DLL injection, process hollowing, APC injection, thread hijacking, and reflective loading. Uses memory forensics, API monitoring, and behavioral analysis to identify injection artifacts. Activates for requests involving process injection detection, code injection analysis, hollowed process investigation, or in-memory threat detection.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detects and analyzes process injection techniques used by malware including classic DLL injection, process hollowing, APC injection, thread hijacking, and reflective loading. Uses memory forensics, API monitoring, and behavioral analysis to identify injection artifacts. Activates for requests involving process injection detection, code injection analysis, hollowed process investigation, or in-memory threat detection. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Detecting Process Injection Techniques [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L40]
  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L61]
  • Step 1: Identify Injection via Memory Forensics [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L63]
  • Step 2: Classify the Injection Technique [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L89]
  • Step 3: Detect Injection via Sysmon Events [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L136]
  • Step 4: Analyze Injected Code [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L194]
  • Step 5: Map to MITRE ATT&CK [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L241]
  • Step 6: Create Detection Signatures [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L262]
  • Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L310]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L1-L38]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
36.5 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/references/api-reference.mdReference2.6 KB
skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/scripts/agent.pyScript9 KB
skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.mdInstruction13.9 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-process-injection-techniques",
  "description": "Detects and analyzes process injection techniques used by malware including classic DLL injection, process hollowing, APC injection, thread hijacking, and reflective loading. Uses memory forensics, API monitoring, and behavioral analysis to identify injection artifacts. Activates for requests involving process injection detection, code injection analysis, hollowed process investigation, or in-memory threat detection.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "malware-analysis",
  "tags": [
    "malware",
    "process-injection",
    "detection",
    "memory-forensics",
    "defense-evasion"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Executable Denylisting",
    "Execution Isolation",
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "File Content Analysis"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.AE-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "ID.RA-01",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1027",
    "T1055",
    "T1140",
    "T1497",
    "T1070"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Detecting Process Injection Techniques

    Source-described action candidate under “Detecting Process Injection Techniques”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 1: Identify Injection via Memory Forensics

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Identify Injection via Memory Forensics”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Use Volatility to detect injected code in process memory:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Identify Injection via Memory Forensics”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 2: Classify the Injection Technique

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Classify the Injection Technique”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (27 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 3: Detect Injection via Sysmon Events

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Detect Injection via Sysmon Events”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Analyze Sysmon and Windows Event Log data:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Detect Injection via Sysmon Events”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 4: Analyze Injected Code

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze Injected Code”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 5: Map to MITRE ATT&CK

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Map to MITRE ATT&CK”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 6: Create Detection Signatures

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Create Detection Signatures”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Capture memory dump of the suspicious svchost.exe process

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Run Volatility `malfind` to detect injected PE in the process memory

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Compare the in-memory image base with the on-disk svchost.exe file hash

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Check the process parent (should be services.exe) and creation parameters

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Dump the hollowed executable from memory and analyze with Ghidra

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Run `netscan` to confirm the network connections from the hollowed process

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Scan dumped code with YARA for malware family identification

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Assuming all svchost.exe instances are identical (each loads different service DLLs)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Not checking the parent process (hollowed processes often have wrong parents)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Relying only on process name matching (attackers specifically target svchost.exe because multiple instances are expected)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Input

    Missing the injection source process that may have already terminated

    Source-described input candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Hollowed svchost.exe Process”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

43 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

3 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 3 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

40 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 40 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-process-injection-techniques
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.