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Skill dossier

detecting-oauth-token-theft

Source declaration

Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L82]
  • Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L84]
  • Step 2: Configure Entra ID Sign-in Risk Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L104]
  • Step 3: Enable Token Protection (Preview) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L145]
  • Step 4: Detect Token Replay in Sign-in Logs [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L167]
  • Step 5: Investigate and Respond to Token Theft [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L209]
  • Step 6: Implement Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L241]
  • Step 7: Configure Defender for Cloud Apps Session Policies [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L264]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L1-L58]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
32.1 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/references/api-reference.mdReference1.6 KB
skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/scripts/agent.pyScript7 KB
skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.mdInstruction12.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-oauth-token-theft",
  "description": "Detect and respond to OAuth token theft and replay in Microsoft Entra ID (Azure AD), covering access token theft, refresh token replay, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) abuse, pass-the-cookie attacks, and Token Protection conditional access policies. Use for impossible-travel or anomalous token-usage alerts, suspected session hijacking, sign-in log analysis, or configuring token-binding defenses in Azure/M365.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "cloud-security",
  "tags": [
    "oauth",
    "token-theft",
    "azure-ad",
    "entra-id",
    "conditional-access",
    "token-replay",
    "identity-security",
    "PRT"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.IR-01",
    "ID.AM-08",
    "GV.SC-06",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1078.004",
    "T1530",
    "T1537",
    "T1580"
  ],
  "mitre_f3": {
    "version": "1.1",
    "tactics": [
      "initial-access",
      "positioning"
    ],
    "techniques": [
      {
        "id": "F1004",
        "name": "Access with Stolen Session Cookie",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1539",
        "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie",
        "tactic": "positioning",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1557",
        "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1550.001",
        "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "attack"
      },
      {
        "id": "F1006",
        "name": "Account Takeover",
        "tactic": "initial-access",
        "source": "f3"
      },
      {
        "id": "T1185",
        "name": "Browser Session Hijacking",
        "tactic": "positioning",
        "source": "attack"
      }
    ]
  }
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    AitM Phishing (Adversary-in-the-Middle): Attacker proxies the legitimate login page via tools like Evilginx2, capturing session cookies and tokens after the user completes MFA

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Device Code Phishing: Attacker generates a device code, sends it to the victim via email/Teams, victim authenticates, attacker receives the token

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    PRT Extraction: Attacker with local admin on a device extracts the Primary Refresh Token using Mimikatz (`sekurlsa::cloudap`) or AADInternals

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (16 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Browser Cookie Theft: Malware or infostealer exfiltrates browser cookies containing session tokens

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand the Token Theft Attack Surface”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 2: Configure Entra ID Sign-in Risk Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Configure Entra ID Sign-in Risk Detection”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 3: Enable Token Protection (Preview)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Enable Token Protection (Preview)”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 4: Detect Token Replay in Sign-in Logs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Detect Token Replay in Sign-in Logs”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 5: Investigate and Respond to Token Theft

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Investigate and Respond to Token Theft”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Decision

    When a token theft event is detected, follow this response procedure:

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Investigate and Respond to Token Theft”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Step 6: Implement Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Implement Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE)”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Step 7: Configure Defender for Cloud Apps Session Policies

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: Configure Defender for Cloud Apps Session Policies”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Verification

    Source-described action candidate under “Verification”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

25 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

6 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 6 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

19 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 19 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-oauth-token-theft/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-oauth-token-theft
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.