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Skill dossier

detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation

Source declaration

Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L79]
  • Step 1: Understand NTLM Relay Attack Flow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L81]
  • Step 2: Event 4624 LogonType 3 Analysis for Relay Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L102]
  • Step 3: Responder Detection via Network and Event Analysis [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L196]
  • Step 4: SMB Signing Enforcement Audit [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L286]
  • Step 5: NTLM Downgrade Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L404]
  • Step 6: NTLM Audit and Restriction Policy Configuration [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L495]
  • Step 7: PetitPotam and Coercion Attack Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L548]
  • Step 8: Build Comprehensive Correlation Dashboard [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L628]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L1-L48]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
6
Markdown files
2
scripts
3
references
1
Size
103 KB
Structural complexity
Moderate

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/references/api-reference.mdReference7.2 KB
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/scripts/agent.pyScript14.4 KB
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/scripts/audit_smb_signing.ps1Script13.6 KB
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/scripts/detect_ntlm_relay.pyScript23 KB
skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.mdInstruction33.9 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation",
  "description": "Detect NTLM relay attacks (T1557.001) by correlating Windows Event 4624 LogonType 3 for IP-to-hostname mismatches, identifying Responder/LLMNR poisoning artifacts, auditing SMB/LDAP signing, and flagging NTLMv2-to-NTLMv1 downgrades. Use for hunting credential relay in NTLM-enabled AD, investigating auth-source anomalies, building SIEM correlation rules, or responding to PetitPotam/DFSCoerce/PrinterBug alerts.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "NTLM-relay",
    "event-correlation",
    "T1557.001",
    "Event-4624",
    "Responder",
    "SMB-signing",
    "LDAP-signing",
    "NTLM-downgrade",
    "PetitPotam",
    "Active-Directory"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "atlas_techniques": [
    "AML.T0051",
    "AML.T0054",
    "AML.T0056",
    "AML.T0020"
  ],
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Network Traffic Community Deviation"
  ],
  "nist_ai_rmf": [
    "MEASURE-2.7",
    "MEASURE-2.5",
    "GOVERN-6.1",
    "MAP-5.1"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1069"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Action

    Overview

    Source-described action candidate under “Overview”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 1: Understand NTLM Relay Attack Flow

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Understand NTLM Relay Attack Flow”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 2: Event 4624 LogonType 3 Analysis for Relay Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Event 4624 LogonType 3 Analysis for Relay Detection”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 3: Responder Detection via Network and Event Analysis

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Responder Detection via Network and Event Analysis”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (29 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 4: SMB Signing Enforcement Audit

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: SMB Signing Enforcement Audit”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 5: NTLM Downgrade Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: NTLM Downgrade Detection”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 6: NTLM Audit and Restriction Policy Configuration

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: NTLM Audit and Restriction Policy Configuration”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 7: PetitPotam and Coercion Attack Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: PetitPotam and Coercion Attack Detection”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 8: Build Comprehensive Correlation Dashboard

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 8: Build Comprehensive Correlation Dashboard”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Query Event 4624 on 10.10.20.100 filtered for IpAddress=10.10.5.50: find 15 successful NTLM logons in 30 minutes from 8 different user accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Cross-reference 10.10.5.50 with DHCP logs and DNS: host is not a registered domain member, MAC address shows a Linux-based NIC

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Query Zeek network logs for 10.10.5.50: identify LLMNR responses (UDP 5355) to multiple workstations and SMB connections to 10.10.20.100

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Confirm IP-hostname mismatch: WorkstationName values (WS-FINANCE01, WS-HR03, etc.) all resolve to different IPs in DNS, not 10.10.5.50

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Check SMB signing on 10.10.20.100: RequireSecuritySignature is False, enabling the relay attack

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Contain: block 10.10.5.50 at the switch, force password reset for all 8 affected accounts, enable SMB signing on the file server

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Remediate: disable LLMNR and NBT-NS via GPO, enforce SMB signing domain-wide

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Confirm the anomaly: DC01$ should only authenticate from 10.10.1.10, but Event 4624 shows authentication from 10.10.5.50 via NTLM (not Kerberos)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Check for certificate enrollment: query AD CS logs for certificate requests from DC01$ around the same timestamp -- find a certificate issued for DC01$

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Identify the attack: PetitPotam coerced DC01 to authenticate to 10.10.5.50, which relayed the authentication to ADCS01 to request a certificate for DC01$

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Assess impact: with a DC certificate, the attacker can authenticate as DC01$ and perform DCSync to extract all domain credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Revoke the fraudulently issued certificate immediately

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Check for DCSync activity: query Event 4662 for directory replication from non-DC sources

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Contain: isolate 10.10.5.50, revoke certificate, patch EFS (MS-EFSRPC), enforce EPA on AD CS, require LDAP signing on all DCs

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

58 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

17 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 17 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

39 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 39 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Dynamic command execution is referenced

2 occurrences

A shell, dynamic evaluation, or process execution primitive appears here. Inspect arguments and input control. Presence in source does not prove a command ran. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 6 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 3 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-ntlm-relay-with-event-correlation
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.