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Skill dossier

detecting-fileless-malware-techniques

Source declaration

Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Use for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Use for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Use for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L71]
  • Step 1: Identify LOLBin Usage [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L73]
  • Step 2: Detect WMI-Based Persistence [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L118]
  • Step 3: Detect Registry-Resident Payloads [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L174]
  • Step 4: Analyze Memory for Fileless Artifacts [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L238]
  • Step 5: Build Comprehensive Detection Rules [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L262]
  • Step 6: Document Fileless Attack Chain [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L310]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.
  • One or more known source files were not retained. Their content and security behavior are unscanned; their inventory byte sizes may be collector-observed or recorded as zero when unknown.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L1-L42]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
5
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
2
Size
38.9 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/references/api-reference.mdReference2.5 KB
skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/references/yara-fileless-powershell.yarReference478 B
skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/scripts/agent.pyScript8.5 KB
skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.mdInstruction16.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-fileless-malware-techniques",
  "description": "Detects and analyzes fileless malware that operates entirely in memory using PowerShell, WMI, .NET reflection, registry-resident payloads, and living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) without writing traditional executable files to disk. Use for requests involving fileless threat detection, in-memory malware investigation, LOLBin abuse analysis, or WMI persistence examination.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "malware-analysis",
  "tags": [
    "malware",
    "fileless",
    "LOLBins",
    "memory-analysis",
    "detection"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Executable Denylisting",
    "Execution Isolation",
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "File Content Analysis"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.AE-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "ID.RA-01",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1027",
    "T1055",
    "T1059",
    "T1112",
    "T1140",
    "T1218",
    "T1497",
    "T1546",
    "T1547"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Windows Defender / Antivirus False Positive

    Source-described action candidate under “Windows Defender / Antivirus False Positive”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 1: Identify LOLBin Usage

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Identify LOLBin Usage”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 2: Detect WMI-Based Persistence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Detect WMI-Based Persistence”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Analyze WMI event subscriptions used for fileless persistence:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Detect WMI-Based Persistence”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (23 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 3: Detect Registry-Resident Payloads

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Detect Registry-Resident Payloads”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 4: Analyze Memory for Fileless Artifacts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze Memory for Fileless Artifacts”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Use memory forensics to find in-memory-only malware:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze Memory for Fileless Artifacts”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 5: Build Comprehensive Detection Rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Build Comprehensive Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Create detection content for fileless techniques:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Build Comprehensive Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Step 6: Document Fileless Attack Chain

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Document Fileless Attack Chain”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Query WMI namespace for event filters, consumers, and bindings to identify the persistence mechanism

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Extract the CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer payload

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Decode the PowerShell command (typically Base64-encoded with -enc flag)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Trace the PowerShell execution in Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for the full deobfuscated payload

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Analyze memory dump for reflectively loaded assemblies and injected code

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Check registry for additional stored payloads referenced by the PowerShell script

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Map the complete attack chain from initial access through persistence and lateral movement

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating a Fileless Attack Using WMI Persistence”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

38 lexical/coverage finding(s) require review. At least one known file was not retained and could not be scanned; this is not a no-findings or safety result.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

11 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 11 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

24 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 24 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Dynamic command execution is referenced

2 occurrences

A shell, dynamic evaluation, or process execution primitive appears here. Inspect arguments and input control. Presence in source does not prove a command ran. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

Source file was not retained for scanning

skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/references/yara-fileless-powershell.yar is known from collection metadata but its content is unavailable. No line-level finding can be made for this file; absence of other matches is not a safety result. Content was not retained by collection policy. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Source evidenceskills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/references/yara-fileless-powershell.yar (path only; content unavailable)

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.
  • One or more known source files were not retained. Their content and security behavior are unscanned; their inventory byte sizes may be collector-observed or recorded as zero when unknown.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 5 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-fileless-malware-techniques
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.