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Skill dossier

detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks

Source declaration

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.md:L54]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.md:L1-L34]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
8
Markdown files
5
scripts
2
references
4
Size
33.4 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/assets/template.mdReference695 B
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/references/api-reference.mdReference1.5 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/references/standards.mdReference1.9 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/references/workflows.mdReference2.2 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/scripts/agent.pyScript5.7 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/scripts/process.pyScript6 KB
skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.mdInstruction4.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks",
  "description": "Detect DLL side-loading and search-order hijacking (MITRE T1574) where adversaries plant malicious DLLs for legitimate signed applications to load, by analyzing Sysmon Event ID 7 DLL-load events, checking signatures/hashes against known-good versions, and flagging path anomalies with EDR tools like CrowdStrike, MDE, or SentinelOne. Use when investigating EDR alerts on unsigned DLLs, hunting for APT persistence via trojanized applications, or triaging incidents involving DLL hijacking.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "mitre-attack",
    "dll-sideloading",
    "defense-evasion",
    "t1574",
    "edr",
    "proactive-detection"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "File Content Analysis",
    "Platform Hardening",
    "File Format Verification"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1027"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Input

    Identify Sideloading Targets: Research known vulnerable applications that load DLLs without full path qualification (LOLBAS, DLL-sideload databases).

    Source-described input candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Input

    Monitor DLL Load Events: Query Sysmon Event ID 7 for DLL loads where the DLL path differs from the application's expected directory.

    Source-described input candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Check DLL Signatures: Flag unsigned or untrusted DLLs loaded by signed executables.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Detect Path Anomalies: Identify legitimate executables running from unusual locations (Temp, AppData, Public) that may be decoy wrappers.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (17 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Hash Verification: Compare loaded DLL hashes against known-good versions and threat intel feeds.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Decision

    Correlate with Process Behavior: Check if the host process exhibits unusual behavior (network connections, child processes) after loading the suspicious DLL.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Output

    Document and Remediate: Report sideloading instances, quarantine malicious DLLs, and update detection rules.

    Source-described output candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Legitimate App Wrapper: Adversary copies signed application (e.g., OneDrive updater) to temp folder alongside malicious DLL with same name as expected dependency.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Phantom DLL Exploitation: Malicious DLL placed in PATH location where legitimate app searches for non-existent DLL.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    DLL Proxy Loading: Malicious version.dll proxies all exports to real version.dll while executing malicious code on DllMain.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Software Update Hijack: Attacker replaces DLL in update staging directory before legitimate updater loads it.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

23 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

21 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 21 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 8 collected file(s), 5 Markdown file(s), and 2 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.