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Skill dossier

detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

Source declaration

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md:L54]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md:L1-L34]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
8
Markdown files
5
scripts
2
references
4
Size
38.6 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/assets/template.mdReference1.6 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/references/api-reference.mdReference2 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/references/standards.mdReference2.3 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/references/workflows.mdReference3 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/scripts/agent.pyScript6.1 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/scripts/process.pyScript5.8 KB
skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.mdInstruction6.6 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",
  "description": "Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for credential theft via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync or Impacket secretsdump, investigating lateral movement with domain admin credentials, or auditing AD replication permissions.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-hunting",
  "tags": [
    "threat-hunting",
    "active-directory",
    "dcsync",
    "credential-theft",
    "mitre-t1003-006",
    "mimikatz",
    "kerberos"
  ],
  "version": "1.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Network Isolation",
    "Network Traffic Analysis",
    "Client-server Payload Profiling",
    "Platform Monitoring"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02",
    "DE.AE-07",
    "ID.RA-05"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1057",
    "T1082",
    "T1083",
    "T1003"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (19 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Input

    Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.

    Source-described input candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Detection Queries

    Source-described action candidate under “Detection Queries”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Mimikatz DCSync: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Impacket secretsdump: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain/user:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Delegated Replication Rights: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Azure AD Connect Abuse: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    DSInternals PowerShell: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

23 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

21 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 21 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 8 collected file(s), 5 Markdown file(s), and 2 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.