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Skill dossier

detecting-command-and-control-over-dns

Source declaration

Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy analysis of query subdomains, ML-based DGA classification, passive DNS correlation, and Zeek/Suricata signatures. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, classifying DGA domains, detecting DNS beaconing, or building DNS anomaly rules for a SOC/SIEM.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy analysis of query subdomains, ML-based DGA classification, passive DNS correlation, and Zeek/Suricata signatures. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, classifying DGA domains, detecting DNS beaconing, or building DNS anomaly rules for a SOC/SIEM.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy analysis of query subdomains, ML-based DGA classification, passive DNS correlation, and Zeek/Suricata signatures. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, classifying DGA domains, detecting DNS beaconing, or building DNS anomaly rules for a SOC/SIEM. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L61]
  • Step 1: Collect and Parse DNS Query Logs [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L63]
  • Step 2: Shannon Entropy Analysis of DNS Queries [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L99]
  • Step 3: TXT Record Payload Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L299]
  • Step 4: DGA Domain Classification with Machine Learning [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L471]
  • Step 5: DNS Beaconing Pattern Detection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L759]
  • Step 6: Integrated DNS C2 Detection Pipeline [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L965]
  • Step 7: SIEM Detection Rules [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L1026]
  • Step 8: Suricata Rules for Known DNS C2 Tools [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L1198]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L1-L33]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
110.4 KB
Structural complexity
Moderate

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/references/api-reference.mdReference8.1 KB
skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/scripts/agent.pyScript39.7 KB
skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.mdInstruction51.5 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "detecting-command-and-control-over-dns",
  "description": "Detect command-and-control (C2) traffic tunneled over DNS from tools like Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp, and Cobalt Strike DNS beacon, using Shannon entropy analysis of query subdomains, ML-based DGA classification, passive DNS correlation, and Zeek/Suricata signatures. Use when investigating suspected DNS tunneling, classifying DGA domains, detecting DNS beaconing, or building DNS anomaly rules for a SOC/SIEM.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "network-security",
  "tags": [
    "dns",
    "c2",
    "tunneling",
    "dga",
    "network-forensics",
    "threat-detection"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.IR-01",
    "DE.CM-01",
    "ID.AM-03",
    "PR.DS-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1046",
    "T1040",
    "T1557",
    "T1071",
    "T1095"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Collect and Parse DNS Query Logs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Parse DNS Query Logs”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 2: Shannon Entropy Analysis of DNS Queries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Shannon Entropy Analysis of DNS Queries”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 3: TXT Record Payload Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: TXT Record Payload Detection”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 4: DGA Domain Classification with Machine Learning

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: DGA Domain Classification with Machine Learning”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (29 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 5: DNS Beaconing Pattern Detection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: DNS Beaconing Pattern Detection”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 6: Integrated DNS C2 Detection Pipeline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Integrated DNS C2 Detection Pipeline”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 7: SIEM Detection Rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: SIEM Detection Rules”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 8: Suricata Rules for Known DNS C2 Tools

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 8: Suricata Rules for Known DNS C2 Tools”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Extract all DNS queries from 10.1.5.42 for the past 24 hours from Zeek dns.log

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Run entropy analysis on subdomain strings -- expect Shannon entropy > 4.0 for encoded tunnel data

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Check query timing intervals for beaconing pattern (likely sub-second for active tunnel)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Examine TXT record responses for size anomalies (tunnel tools use maximum-size TXT responses)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Compare subdomain patterns against known tool signatures (Iodine, dnscat2, dns2tcp)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Query passive DNS for `tunnelsvc.example.com` registration date, nameserver, and historical resolutions

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Decision

    If confirmed, add domain to DNS RPZ blocklist and isolate endpoint via EDR

    Source-described decision candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Capture full packet trace for forensic analysis of tunnel payload content

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Suspected DNS Tunneling from an Internal Host”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Collect training data: Tranco/Alexa top 1M for legitimate domains, DGArchive or OSINT feeds for known DGA domains

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Extract character-level features: entropy, length, digit ratio, consonant sequences, bigram scores

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Train Random Forest and Gradient Boosting classifiers, evaluate with 5-fold cross-validation

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Deploy the model as a scoring enrichment in the SIEM (Splunk ML Toolkit or Elastic ML)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Set threshold: DGA probability > 0.85 generates alert, > 0.65 generates investigation ticket

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Create a whitelist of known high-entropy legitimate domains (CDNs, cloud services) to reduce false positives

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Retrain monthly with new DGA samples from threat intel feeds

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Building a DGA Detection Model for SOC Deployment”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

141 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

11 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 11 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

128 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 128 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Downloaded content may be executed

This line combines retrieval and execution. Such patterns can run mutable remote code. Review pinning, integrity checks, and isolation; the analyzer performed no download or execution. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Dynamic command execution is referenced

A shell, dynamic evaluation, or process execution primitive appears here. Inspect arguments and input control. Presence in source does not prove a command ran. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/detecting-command-and-control-over-dns
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.