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Skill dossier

correlating-threat-campaigns

Source declaration

Correlates disparate security incidents, IOCs, and adversary behaviors across time and organizations to identify unified threat campaigns, attribute them to common threat actors, and extract shared indicators for improved detection. Use when multiple incidents exhibit overlapping indicators, when sector-wide attack campaigns require cross-organizational analysis, or when building campaign-level intelligence products. Activates for requests involving campaign analysis, incident clustering, cross-organizational IOC correlation, or MISP correlation engine.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Correlates disparate security incidents, IOCs, and adversary behaviors across time and organizations to identify unified threat campaigns, attribute them to common threat actors, and extract shared indicators for improved detection. Use when multiple incidents exhibit overlapping indicators, when sector-wide attack campaigns require cross-organizational analysis, or when building campaign-level intelligence products. Activates for requests involving campaign analysis, incident clustering, cross-organizational IOC correlation, or MISP correlation engine.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Correlates disparate security incidents, IOCs, and adversary behaviors across time and organizations to identify unified threat campaigns, attribute them to common threat actors, and extract shared indicators for improved detection. Use when multiple incidents exhibit overlapping indicators, when sector-wide attack campaigns require cross-organizational analysis, or when building campaign-level intelligence products. Activates for requests involving campaign analysis, incident clustering, cross-organizational IOC correlation, or MISP correlation engine. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L68]
  • Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L94]
  • Step 4: Build Campaign Graph [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L123]
  • Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L135]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L1-L37]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
27.6 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/references/api-reference.mdReference2.1 KB
skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/scripts/agent.pyScript7.3 KB
skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.mdInstruction7.1 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "correlating-threat-campaigns",
  "description": "Correlates disparate security incidents, IOCs, and adversary behaviors across time and organizations to identify unified threat campaigns, attribute them to common threat actors, and extract shared indicators for improved detection. Use when multiple incidents exhibit overlapping indicators, when sector-wide attack campaigns require cross-organizational analysis, or when building campaign-level intelligence products. Activates for requests involving campaign analysis, incident clustering, cross-organizational IOC correlation, or MISP correlation engine.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "threat-intelligence",
  "tags": [
    "campaign-analysis",
    "correlation",
    "MISP",
    "ATT&CK",
    "threat-actor",
    "intrusion-set",
    "clustering",
    "CTI"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "team-cybersecurity",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-05",
    "DE.CM-01",
    "DE.AE-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1566",
    "T1071.001",
    "T1587.001",
    "T1583.001",
    "T1588.002"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Internal SIEM (raw events, alert history)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    TIP (historical indicators and events)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    ISAC sharing (partner-submitted events in MISP or TAXII)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (43 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Commercial intelligence (Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike reports)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Collect and Normalize Events”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Apply systematic pivot analysis across four dimensions:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Same IP address or /24 subnet across events

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Same domain registrant email or WHOIS organization

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Same ASN or hosting provider with same account fingerprint

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Same SSL certificate fingerprint or serial number across C2 domains

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Same malware hash or YARA signature match

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Same C2 communication protocol (Cobalt Strike beacon config, Sliver implant parameters)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Same exploit code or weaponized document template

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Same obfuscation method or packer fingerprint

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Events occurring within same time window (operational hours suggesting same timezone)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Sequential events with logical kill chain progression

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Malware compilation timestamps clustering in same date range

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Same target sector (healthcare, energy, financial)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Same target geography

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Same targeted technology (specific ERP vendor, VPN appliance brand)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Identify Correlation Pivot Points”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Apply weighted scoring for campaign attribution:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Calculate Correlation Confidence”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Step 4: Build Campaign Graph

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Campaign object (STIX) as central node

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Intrusion Set → uses → Malware objects

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Intrusion Set → uses → Infrastructure objects

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Intrusion Set → targets → Identity objects (victim organizations/sectors)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Decision

    Campaign → attributed-to → Threat Actor (if attribution achieved)

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Indicators → indicates → Malware (linking technical observables to capabilities)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Build Campaign Graph”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Output

    Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Campaign name: Assign descriptive codename based on targeting theme or tooling

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Timeline: First/last observed dates with activity phases

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Attribution: Suspected threat actor with confidence level

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Target profile: Industry verticals, geographies, organization sizes

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    TTPs summary: ATT&CK Navigator heatmap for campaign-specific techniques

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Shared indicators: IOCs that span multiple incidents (highest confidence for blocking)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Detection guidance: Sigma/YARA rules specific to this campaign

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Produce Campaign Intelligence Report”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Common Pitfalls

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Pitfalls”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

26 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useObserved
Medium

Network access is mentioned

10 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 10 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

15 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 15 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Credential or secret material is referenced

This line resembles a credential literal or reads a sensitive environment value. Do not expose its contents; verify whether it is a placeholder, required secret, or accidentally committed material. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/correlating-threat-campaigns/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/correlating-threat-campaigns
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.