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Skill dossier

containing-active-breach

Source declaration

Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term and long-term containment using network segmentation, endpoint isolation, credential revocation, and access control modifications. Activates for requests involving breach containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment, or live incident response.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term and long-term containment using network segmentation, endpoint isolation, credential revocation, and access control modifications. Activates for requests involving breach containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment, or live incident response.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term and long-term containment using network segmentation, endpoint isolation, credential revocation, and access control modifications. Activates for requests involving breach containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment, or live incident response. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L56]
  • Step 1: Assess Containment Scope [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L58]
  • Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L79]
  • Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L102]
  • Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L112]
  • Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L132]
  • Step 6: Communicate Containment Status [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L142]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L1-L33]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
31.3 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/containing-active-breach/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/containing-active-breach/references/api-reference.mdReference2.5 KB
skills/containing-active-breach/scripts/agent.pyScript7.4 KB
skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.mdInstruction10.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "containing-active-breach",
  "description": "Executes containment strategies to stop active adversary operations and prevent lateral movement during a confirmed security breach. Implements short-term and long-term containment using network segmentation, endpoint isolation, credential revocation, and access control modifications. Activates for requests involving breach containment, lateral movement prevention, network isolation, active threat containment, or live incident response.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "incident-response",
  "tags": [
    "breach-containment",
    "lateral-movement",
    "network-isolation",
    "credential-revocation",
    "live-response"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1486",
    "T1021.002",
    "T1078",
    "T1071.001",
    "T1570"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "RS.MA-01",
    "RS.MA-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "RC.RP-01"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Assess Containment Scope

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Identify all confirmed compromised hosts via EDR telemetry and SIEM correlation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Map lateral movement paths using authentication logs (Windows Event ID 4624 Type 3 and Type 10)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Identify all compromised credentials (check for pass-the-hash, Kerberoasting, DCSync activity)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (57 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Determine C2 channels (beacon intervals, domains, IPs, protocols)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Decision

    Assess whether the adversary has domain admin or equivalent privileges

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 1: Assess Containment Scope”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Isolate confirmed compromised endpoints via EDR network containment (maintains agent communication)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Block C2 IP addresses and domains at perimeter firewall and internal DNS

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Implement microsegmentation rules to prevent communication between compromised hosts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Sinkhole C2 domains at internal DNS to capture connection attempts from undiscovered implants

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Disable compromised user accounts in Active Directory (do not delete; preserve audit trail)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Reset passwords for all compromised accounts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Revoke active sessions and tokens (Azure AD: `Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken`)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Disable the compromised service account and rotate its credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Decision

    If Domain Admin is compromised: double-reset the KRBTGT password (reset twice, 12 hours apart)

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Use EDR to terminate malicious processes on contained hosts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Block known malicious hashes in EDR prevention policy

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Quarantine identified malware samples

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Disable remote services (WinRM, RDP, SMB) on critical servers not yet compromised

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Execute Short-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Create network ACLs isolating the compromised VLAN/subnet while allowing business-critical traffic

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Deploy temporary jump hosts for administrators to access contained systems for investigation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Implement enhanced monitoring (full packet capture) on network segments adjacent to compromised hosts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Enable advanced audit policies on all domain controllers (4768, 4769, 4771 for Kerberos attacks)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Deploy canary tokens and honeypot accounts to detect adversary attempts to expand from containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Execute Long-Term Containment”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Monitor for new C2 callbacks from any internal host to known adversary infrastructure

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Check for new lateral movement attempts (failed authentication from disabled accounts)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Verify that contained hosts cannot reach the internet except through the EDR agent

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Confirm that compromised credentials produce authentication failures

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Review SIEM for any new alerts matching the adversary's known TTPs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Validate Containment Effectiveness”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Capture memory dumps from compromised hosts before any remediation (use WinPmem or Magnet RAM Capture)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Collect volatile data: running processes, network connections, logged-on users, scheduled tasks

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Output

    Export relevant event logs before they rotate (Security, System, PowerShell, Sysmon)

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Capture network traffic between compromised hosts and C2 infrastructure

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Document all containment actions with timestamps for the incident timeline

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Preserve Evidence During Containment”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Step 6: Communicate Containment Status

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Input

    Provide structured status updates to incident commander and stakeholders:

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Current containment effectiveness (percentage of adversary activity stopped)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Remaining risks (undiscovered implants, persistence mechanisms not yet identified)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Business impact of containment actions (which systems are offline, user impact)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Estimated timeline for eradication phase

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Escalation needs (law enforcement notification, external IR retainer activation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Communicate Containment Status”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Action

    Immediately isolate all three file servers via EDR network containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  46. 52
    Action

    Disable the compromised service account in Active Directory

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  47. 53
    Action

    Block SMB (TCP 445) between all server VLANs at the network switch layer

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  48. 54
    Action

    Deploy an emergency GPO disabling the SMB server service on non-critical endpoints

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  49. 55
    Action

    Capture memory from one encrypted server before it reboots

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  50. 56
    Action

    Search for the ransomware binary hash across all endpoints using EDR threat hunting

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB”; not verified execution.

  51. 57
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Attention recommended

20 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

6 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 6 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

File deletion is described or implemented

Deletion syntax occurs in this line, including possible documentation. Review its exact target, recursive scope, and safeguards. The analyzer did not execute it. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

12 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 12 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

High

Elevated privileges are referenced

Privilege-elevation syntax is present. Confirm whether elevation is necessary and inspect every operation performed under it; static analysis cannot prove that elevation succeeded. This rule matched 1 location(s) in the collected text; 1 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/containing-active-breach/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/containing-active-breach
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.