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Skill dossier

conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test

Source declaration

Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L67]
  • Step 1: Static Analysis [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L69]
  • Step 2: Network Security Testing [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L88]
  • Step 3: Data Storage Analysis [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L105]
  • Step 4: Authentication and Session Management [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L124]
  • Step 5: Runtime Manipulation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L134]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L1-L43]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
33.2 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/references/api-reference.mdReference2.1 KB
skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/scripts/agent.pyScript7.7 KB
skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.mdInstruction12.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test",
  "description": "Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "penetration-testing",
  "tags": [
    "mobile-pentest",
    "OWASP-MASTG",
    "Android-security",
    "iOS-security",
    "mobile-application-security"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_ai_rmf": [
    "MEASURE-2.7",
    "MAP-5.1",
    "MANAGE-2.4"
  ],
  "atlas_techniques": [
    "AML.T0070",
    "AML.T0066",
    "AML.T0082"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "ID.RA-06",
    "GV.OV-02",
    "DE.AE-07"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1426",
    "T1409",
    "T1521.003",
    "T1633",
    "T1417",
    "T1422"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Static Analysis

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Analyze the application binary without executing it:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Input

    Decompile the APK: `jadx -d output/ target.apk` to obtain Java/Kotlin source code

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Review `AndroidManifest.xml` for exported components (activities, services, receivers, content providers), permissions, and debuggable flag

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (65 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Output

    Search for hardcoded secrets: `grep -rn "apikey\|password\|secret\|token\|aws" output/`

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Identify insecure data storage patterns: SharedPreferences with sensitive data, SQLite databases without encryption, files in external storage

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Check for WebView vulnerabilities: `setJavaScriptEnabled(true)`, `addJavascriptInterface()`, and loading untrusted content

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Input

    Run MobSF automated scan: `python manage.py runserver` and upload the APK for automated static analysis

    Source-described input candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Extract the IPA and locate the Mach-O binary

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Use `otool -L <binary>` to list linked frameworks and identify third-party libraries

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Analyze with Ghidra or Hopper for hardcoded URLs, API endpoints, and embedded credentials

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Check Info.plist for App Transport Security (ATS) exceptions that allow insecure HTTP connections

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Review embedded entitlements for excessive capabilities

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Static Analysis”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Step 2: Network Security Testing

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Configure Burp Suite as proxy on the test device and install the Burp CA certificate

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Exercise all application functionality while Burp captures API traffic

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Decision

    SSL/TLS validation: Verify the app validates server certificates properly. If the app fails to connect through the proxy, it may implement certificate pinning.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Certificate pinning bypass:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Android: Use Frida script: `frida -U -f com.target.app -l ssl-pinning-bypass.js --no-pause`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    iOS: Use SSL Kill Switch or Objection: `objection -g "Target App" explore --startup-command "ios sslpinning disable"`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    API traffic analysis: Review all API calls for:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Sensitive data transmitted without encryption

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Authentication tokens in URL parameters (visible in logs)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Excessive data in API responses beyond what the UI displays

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Missing or weak authentication on API endpoints

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    WebSocket and custom protocols: Check for non-HTTP communication channels that may bypass standard proxy interception

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Network Security Testing”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Step 3: Data Storage Analysis

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Access app data directory: `/data/data/com.target.app/`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Check SharedPreferences XML files for stored credentials, tokens, and PII

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Examine SQLite databases: `sqlite3 /data/data/com.target.app/databases/.db ".dump"`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Check for sensitive data in application logs: `logcat -d | grep -i "password\|token\|key"`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Verify that application data is excluded from backups: `android:allowBackup="false"` in AndroidManifest.xml

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Check clipboard for sensitive data leakage

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Examine the Keychain for stored credentials: `objection -g "Target App" explore` then `ios keychain dump`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Check NSUserDefaults/plist files: `find /var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/ -name ".plist" -exec plutil -p {} \;`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Inspect SQLite databases and Core Data stores for unencrypted sensitive data

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Check for data leaking through screenshots (iOS captures screenshots during app backgrounding)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Verify data protection class: sensitive files should use NSFileProtectionComplete

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Data Storage Analysis”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Step 4: Authentication and Session Management

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Decision

    Biometric bypass: Test if biometric authentication can be bypassed by hooking the authentication callback with Frida to always return success

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Token storage: Verify that authentication tokens are stored in the Keychain (iOS) or Android Keystore, not in SharedPreferences or files

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Session timeout: Verify that sessions expire after a reasonable idle timeout and that tokens are invalidated server-side on logout

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Decision

    Root/jailbreak detection bypass: Test if the app detects rooted/jailbroken devices and if the detection can be bypassed with Frida or Magisk Hide

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Decision

    Deep link abuse: Test if custom URL schemes or universal links can be used to bypass authentication or access restricted functionality

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 4: Authentication and Session Management”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Step 5: Runtime Manipulation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Frida hooking: Use Frida to hook and modify application functions at runtime:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Output

    Bypass root detection: hook the detection function to return false

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Output

    Modify return values of authentication checks

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  45. 51
    Action

    Intercept encryption functions to capture plaintext data before encryption

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  46. 52
    Action

    Bypass certificate pinning by hooking SSL verification

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  47. 53
    Action

    Method swizzling (iOS): Use Frida to replace Objective-C method implementations

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  48. 54
    Action

    Intent manipulation (Android): Send crafted intents to exported components: `adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.InternalActivity -e "userid" "admin"`

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  49. 55
    Decision

    Tampering detection: Modify the APK/IPA (add code, change resources), re-sign, and install. Verify whether the app detects tampering.

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Runtime Manipulation”; not verified execution.

  50. 56
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  51. 57
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  52. 58
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  53. 59
    Action

    Static analysis of the Android APK reveals API endpoints, a hardcoded staging server URL, and an AWS API key in a configuration file

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  54. 60
    Action

    Certificate pinning is implemented but bypassed with Frida SSL pinning bypass script

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  55. 61
    Action

    API traffic analysis reveals that the balance check endpoint returns all account numbers associated with the user, not just the requested account

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  56. 62
    Action

    Local data storage analysis finds that the app caches the last 10 transactions in an unencrypted SQLite database

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  57. 63
    Action

    Biometric authentication bypass: Frida hook on the biometric callback always returns success, granting access without fingerprint

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  58. 64
    Output

    Root detection is present but bypassed with Magisk Hide module, allowing the app to run on a rooted device with full data access

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment”; not verified execution.

  59. 65
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

15 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

7 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 7 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

8 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 8 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/conducting-mobile-app-penetration-test
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.