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Skill dossier

conducting-malware-incident-response

Source declaration

Respond to malware infections across enterprise endpoints by identifying the malware family, determining infection vectors, assessing spread, and executing containment, analysis, eradication, and recovery procedures aligned to MITRE ATT&CK. Use when responding to a confirmed or suspected malware infection, including trojan/worm/ransomware outbreaks, malware triage, or infected endpoint remediation.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Respond to malware infections across enterprise endpoints by identifying the malware family, determining infection vectors, assessing spread, and executing containment, analysis, eradication, and recovery procedures aligned to MITRE ATT&CK. Use when responding to a confirmed or suspected malware infection, including trojan/worm/ransomware outbreaks, malware triage, or infected endpoint remediation.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Respond to malware infections across enterprise endpoints by identifying the malware family, determining infection vectors, assessing spread, and executing containment, analysis, eradication, and recovery procedures aligned to MITRE ATT&CK. Use when responding to a confirmed or suspected malware infection, including trojan/worm/ransomware outbreaks, malware triage, or infected endpoint remediation. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L55]
  • Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L57]
  • Step 2: Scope the Infection [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L77]
  • Step 3: Contain Infected Systems [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L87]
  • Step 4: Analyze the Malware [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L97]
  • Step 5: Eradicate the Malware [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L125]
  • Step 6: Recover and Validate [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L136]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L1-L32]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
29.7 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/references/api-reference.mdReference1.7 KB
skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/scripts/agent.pyScript7.1 KB
skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.mdInstruction9.8 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "conducting-malware-incident-response",
  "description": "Respond to malware infections across enterprise endpoints by identifying the malware family, determining infection vectors, assessing spread, and executing containment, analysis, eradication, and recovery procedures aligned to MITRE ATT&CK. Use when responding to a confirmed or suspected malware infection, including trojan/worm/ransomware outbreaks, malware triage, or infected endpoint remediation.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "incident-response",
  "tags": [
    "malware-response",
    "malware-analysis",
    "eradication",
    "endpoint-remediation",
    "MITRE-ATT&CK"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1204",
    "T1027",
    "T1055",
    "T1059",
    "T1486"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "File Metadata Consistency Validation",
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Identifier Analysis",
    "Content Format Conversion",
    "Message Analysis"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "RS.MA-01",
    "RS.MA-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "RC.RP-01"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Validate the malware alert and gather initial indicators:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Review EDR alert details: detection name, file path, hash (SHA-256), process tree

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Decision

    Check if the detection is a known malware family or generic heuristic detection

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (50 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Query the file hash against VirusTotal, MalwareBazaar, and internal threat intelligence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Examine the process execution chain to determine how the malware was delivered

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm Malware Presence”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 2: Scope the Infection

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Use EDR to search for the malware hash, filename, and behavioral indicators across all endpoints

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Check for network-based spreading (SMB, WMI, PsExec, exploitation)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Query email gateway logs for all recipients of the delivery email

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Search for C2 communications to the identified infrastructure from other internal hosts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Check for persistence mechanisms on all identified infected hosts

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Scope the Infection”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Step 3: Contain Infected Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Network-isolate infected endpoints via EDR containment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Block malware C2 infrastructure at firewall and DNS

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Block the malware hash in EDR prevention policy organization-wide

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Decision

    Quarantine the delivery email from all mailboxes (if email-delivered)

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Decision

    Disable compromised user accounts if credential theft is suspected

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 3: Contain Infected Systems”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Step 4: Analyze the Malware

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Output

    Submit the sample to a sandbox for dynamic analysis (behavioral report, dropped files, network IOCs)

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Identify all persistence mechanisms: registry keys, scheduled tasks, services, WMI subscriptions, startup folders

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Document all file system artifacts: dropped files, modified files, created directories

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Extract network IOCs: C2 domains, IPs, URLs, user agents, JA3/JA3S hashes

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Map observed behaviors to MITRE ATT&CK techniques

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Analyze the Malware”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Step 5: Eradicate the Malware

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Terminate malicious processes and injected threads

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Delete malware files from all identified paths

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Remove persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks, registry keys, services, WMI subscriptions)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Decision

    Clear browser credential stores if credential harvesting was confirmed

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Run a full EDR scan to verify no artifacts remain

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Decision

    If eradication confidence is low, reimage the system from a known-clean gold image

    Source-described decision candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate the Malware”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Step 6: Recover and Validate

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Reconnect contained systems to the network in stages

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Monitor for 72 hours for any recurrence of malware indicators

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Force password resets for all users on infected endpoints

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Verify that C2 traffic has completely ceased across the environment

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Update detection rules based on newly discovered IOCs from the investigation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Distribute IOCs to threat intelligence sharing partners (ISAC, MISP)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Recover and Validate”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Immediately isolate all three hosts and block C2 IPs at the perimeter

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Search email gateway for all recipients of the original phishing email and quarantine it

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Action

    Sweep all endpoints for the Emotet DLL hash and Cobalt Strike beacon indicators

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  41. 47
    Action

    Analyze the Cobalt Strike beacon configuration to extract watermark, C2 profile, and staging URLs

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  42. 48
    Action

    Check for credential harvesting (Mimikatz/LSASS dump) and lateral movement artifacts

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  43. 49
    Action

    Eradicate all malware artifacts and reset credentials for affected users

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Emotet Loader Leading to Cobalt Strike Deployment”; not verified execution.

  44. 50
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

17 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

13 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 13 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

4 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 4 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/conducting-malware-incident-response/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/conducting-malware-incident-response
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.