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Skill dossier

conducting-cloud-penetration-testing

Source declaration

This skill outlines methodologies for performing authorized penetration testing against AWS, Azure, and GCP cloud environments. It covers understanding the shared responsibility model for testing scope, leveraging cloud-specific attack tools like Pacu and ScoutSuite, exploiting IAM misconfigurations, testing for SSRF to cloud metadata services, and reporting findings aligned to MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

This skill outlines methodologies for performing authorized penetration testing against AWS, Azure, and GCP cloud environments. It covers understanding the shared responsibility model for testing scope, leveraging cloud-specific attack tools like Pacu and ScoutSuite, exploiting IAM misconfigurations, testing for SSRF to cloud metadata services, and reporting findings aligned to MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

This skill outlines methodologies for performing authorized penetration testing against AWS, Azure, and GCP cloud environments. It covers understanding the shared responsibility model for testing scope, leveraging cloud-specific attack tools like Pacu and ScoutSuite, exploiting IAM misconfigurations, testing for SSRF to cloud metadata services, and reporting findings aligned to MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L68]
  • Step 1: Define Scope and Rules of Engagement [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L70]
  • Step 2: Reconnaissance and Cloud Enumeration [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L99]
  • Step 3: IAM Privilege Escalation Testing [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L124]
  • Step 4: SSRF to Cloud Metadata Service Exploitation [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L150]
  • Step 5: Lateral Movement and Data Access [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L173]
  • Step 6: Persistence and Detection Evasion Testing [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L196]
  • Step 7: Report Findings with MITRE ATT&CK Mapping [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L222]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L1-L46]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
32.8 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/references/api-reference.mdReference2.3 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/scripts/agent.pyScript6.9 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.mdInstruction12.7 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "conducting-cloud-penetration-testing",
  "description": "This skill outlines methodologies for performing authorized penetration testing against AWS, Azure, and GCP cloud environments. It covers understanding the shared responsibility model for testing scope, leveraging cloud-specific attack tools like Pacu and ScoutSuite, exploiting IAM misconfigurations, testing for SSRF to cloud metadata services, and reporting findings aligned to MITRE ATT&CK Cloud matrix.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "cloud-security",
  "tags": [
    "cloud-pentesting",
    "offensive-security",
    "aws-exploitation",
    "shared-responsibility",
    "mitre-attack-cloud"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_ai_rmf": [
    "MEASURE-2.7",
    "MAP-5.1",
    "MANAGE-2.4"
  ],
  "atlas_techniques": [
    "AML.T0070",
    "AML.T0066",
    "AML.T0082"
  ],
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Token Binding",
    "Restore Access",
    "Application Protocol Command Analysis",
    "Reissue Credential",
    "Network Isolation"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "PR.IR-01",
    "ID.AM-08",
    "GV.SC-06",
    "DE.CM-01"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1078.004",
    "T1580",
    "T1530",
    "T1538"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Define Scope and Rules of Engagement

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Define Scope and Rules of Engagement”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 2: Reconnaissance and Cloud Enumeration

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Reconnaissance and Cloud Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Use cloud-specific tools to enumerate the attack surface: exposed services, public IPs, S3 buckets, IAM configurations, and metadata endpoints.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Reconnaissance and Cloud Enumeration”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Step 3: IAM Privilege Escalation Testing

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: IAM Privilege Escalation Testing”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (21 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Use Pacu to identify and exploit IAM misconfigurations that allow privilege escalation from a low-privilege starting point to administrative access.

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: IAM Privilege Escalation Testing”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Step 4: SSRF to Cloud Metadata Service Exploitation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: SSRF to Cloud Metadata Service Exploitation”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 5: Lateral Movement and Data Access

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Lateral Movement and Data Access”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Step 6: Persistence and Detection Evasion Testing

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Persistence and Detection Evasion Testing”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Output

    Step 7: Report Findings with MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 7: Report Findings with MITRE ATT&CK Mapping”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Exploit the SSRF to reach http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role-name>

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Extract temporary IAM credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Use the credentials to enumerate accessible S3 buckets and download sensitive data

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Decision

    Check if the role has iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction for privilege escalation to admin

    Source-described decision candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Document the full attack chain from SSRF to account-level compromise

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Recommend: enforce IMDSv2, reduce IAM role scope, add VPC endpoint policies blocking IMDS from application tier

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: SSRF in Web Application Leads to Full Account Compromise”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

17 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

11 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 11 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

6 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 6 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/conducting-cloud-penetration-testing
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.