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Static reviewDevelopment

Skill dossier

conducting-cloud-incident-response

Source declaration

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L48]
  • Step 1: Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L50]
  • Step 2: Contain Cloud Identity Compromise [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L88]
  • Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L138]
  • Step 4: Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L162]
  • Step 5: Eradicate and Recover [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L186]
  • Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L197]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L1-L25]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
32.5 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/references/api-reference.mdReference2.4 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/scripts/agent.pyScript7.4 KB
skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.mdInstruction11.6 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "conducting-cloud-incident-response",
  "description": "Respond to security incidents in AWS, Azure, and GCP via identity-based containment, cloud-native log analysis (CloudTrail, Azure Activity Logs, GCP Audit Logs), resource isolation, and forensic evidence acquisition adapted for ephemeral cloud infrastructure. Use when CSPM alerts or audit logs show compromised cloud credentials, unauthorized IAM changes, or a breach spanning cloud services.",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "incident-response",
  "tags": [
    "cloud-IR",
    "AWS-forensics",
    "Azure-incident-response",
    "GCP-security",
    "identity-containment"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1078",
    "T1537",
    "T1580",
    "T1525"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mahipal",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "nist_csf": [
    "RS.MA-01",
    "RS.MA-02",
    "RS.AN-03",
    "RC.RP-01"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Detect and Confirm the Cloud Incident”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 2: Contain Cloud Identity Compromise

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Contain Cloud Identity Compromise”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Output

    Export CloudTrail events to S3 in the forensic account

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (46 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Snapshot EBS volumes of compromised EC2 instances

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Copy S3 access logs and object versions

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Output

    Export VPC Flow Logs for the affected VPC

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Capture IAM credential reports and access advisor data

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Output

    Export Azure Activity Logs and Sign-in Logs (90-day retention by default)

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Snapshot managed disks of compromised VMs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Output

    Export Azure AD audit logs

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Capture NSG flow logs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Output

    Export Conditional Access sign-in details

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Output

    Export Cloud Audit Logs to a forensic storage bucket

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Snapshot persistent disks of compromised VMs

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Output

    Export VPC Flow Logs

    Source-described output candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Capture IAM policy snapshots

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Preserve Cloud Evidence”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Step 4: Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Analyze logs for common cloud attack techniques:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Investigate Cloud-Specific Attack Patterns”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Action

    Step 5: Eradicate and Recover

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Rotate all compromised credentials (access keys, passwords, service principal secrets)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Action

    Remove unauthorized IAM users, roles, policies, and access keys created by the attacker

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Action

    Terminate unauthorized compute instances (crypto-miners, C2 servers)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  20. 26
    Action

    Restore modified S3 bucket policies and storage access policies to pre-incident state

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  21. 27
    Action

    Re-enable security controls that were disabled (CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Defender for Cloud)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  22. 28
    Action

    Review and restore Conditional Access policies and MFA configurations

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Eradicate and Recover”; not verified execution.

  23. 29
    Action

    Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  24. 30
    Action

    Enable MFA for all IAM users and require MFA for sensitive API calls

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  25. 31
    Action

    Implement SCPs (AWS) or Azure Policy to prevent logging disablement

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  26. 32
    Action

    Enable GuardDuty / Defender for Cloud / Security Command Center with auto-remediation

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  27. 33
    Action

    Implement least-privilege IAM policies using access analyzer data

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  28. 34
    Action

    Enable IMDS v2 (token-required) on all EC2 instances to prevent SSRF-based token theft

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  29. 35
    Action

    Configure budget alerts to detect crypto-mining cost spikes

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Post-Incident Cloud Hardening”; not verified execution.

  30. 36
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  31. 37
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  32. 38
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  33. 39
    Action

    Immediately disable the compromised access key via AWS IAM

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  34. 40
    Action

    Attach AWSDenyAll policy to the affected IAM user

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  35. 41
    Action

    Query CloudTrail for all API calls made with the compromised key since exposure

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  36. 42
    Action

    Identify resources created or modified by the attacker (EC2 instances for crypto-mining, new IAM users for persistence)

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  37. 43
    Action

    Terminate unauthorized resources and remove backdoor IAM entities

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  38. 44
    Action

    Rotate all credentials the compromised user had access to

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  39. 45
    Action

    Enable GitHub secret scanning to prevent future credential leaks

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: AWS Access Key Compromised via Public GitHub Repository”; not verified execution.

  40. 46
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

5 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

3 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 3 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/conducting-cloud-incident-response/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/conducting-cloud-incident-response
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.