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Static reviewDevelopment

Skill dossier

analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence

Source declaration

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications, Secure Boot bypass, UEFI variable manipulation) using chipsec for firmware integrity verification, detecting known families like BlackLotus, LoJax, and MoonBounce. Use for UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

The author's original description, preserved in English. It describes intent, not verified performance.

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications, Secure Boot bypass, UEFI variable manipulation) using chipsec for firmware integrity verification, detecting known families like BlackLotus, LoJax, and MoonBounce. Use for UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, or Secure Boot bypass detection.

developmentreferencesscripts

Research summary

Machine-generated analysis; pending human review

These observations come from deterministic source parsing, not a human security review or controlled task evaluation.

Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications, Secure Boot bypass, UEFI variable manipulation) using chipsec for firmware integrity verification, detecting known families like BlackLotus, LoJax, and MoonBounce. Use for UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, or Secure Boot bypass detection. This bilingual summary is generated deterministically from collected source text and file structure; it is pending human editorial review.

Review scope

Deterministic static analysis of collected SKILL.md and supporting text/code. Machine-assisted candidates and findings await human editorial review; no dynamic behavior or effect is assessed.

Observable capabilities

  • Workflow [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L64]
  • Step 1: Dump SPI Flash Firmware [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L66]
  • Step 2: Inspect UEFI Variables [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L93]
  • Step 3: Analyze EFI System Partition (ESP) [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L118]
  • Step 4: Scan Firmware for Known Bootkit Signatures [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L149]
  • Step 5: Detect Secure Boot Bypass Mechanisms [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L173]
  • Step 6: Perform Boot Chain Integrity Verification [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L202]
  • Step 7: Document UEFI Bootkit Analysis Findings [Source statement; provisional, not tested. Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L227]

Limitations & scope

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Relevant for

  • Practitioners evaluating whether to inspect and install the source skill; this audience is inferred from the product context, not measured usage. [Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L1-L39]

What ships with the skill

The file inventory comes from the collected source at the recorded commit. Paths and sizes are structural observations, not a measure of quality.

files
4
Markdown files
2
scripts
1
references
1
Size
52.8 KB
Structural complexity
Low

File inventory

PathTypeBytes
skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/LICENSEOther11 KB
skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/references/api-reference.mdReference5.6 KB
skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/scripts/agent.pyScript21.8 KB
skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.mdInstruction14.4 KB

SKILL.md frontmatter

{
  "name": "analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence",
  "description": "Analyzes UEFI bootkit persistence (SPI flash implants, ESP modifications, Secure Boot bypass, UEFI variable manipulation) using chipsec for firmware integrity verification, detecting known families like BlackLotus, LoJax, and MoonBounce. Use for UEFI malware analysis, firmware persistence investigation, or Secure Boot bypass detection.\n",
  "domain": "cybersecurity",
  "subdomain": "firmware-security",
  "tags": [
    "UEFI",
    "bootkit",
    "firmware",
    "Secure-Boot",
    "chipsec",
    "ESP",
    "persistence"
  ],
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "author": "mukul975",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "d3fend_techniques": [
    "Platform Hardening",
    "Restore Object",
    "Platform Monitoring",
    "Firmware Verification",
    "Firmware Embedded Monitoring Code"
  ],
  "nist_csf": [
    "ID.RA-01",
    "PR.PS-01",
    "PR.PS-02"
  ],
  "mitre_attack": [
    "T1542.001",
    "T1542.003",
    "T1553.006",
    "T1542",
    "T1014"
  ]
}

A reading of the operating sequence

This workflow reconstructs the apparent sequence from source material. Unless controlled evaluation is explicitly recorded, it is provisional—not an observed trace.

  1. 01
    Decision

    When to Use

    Source-described decision candidate under “When to Use”; not verified execution.

  2. 02
    Action

    Workflow

    Source-described action candidate under “Workflow”; not verified execution.

  3. 03
    Action

    Step 1: Dump SPI Flash Firmware

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 1: Dump SPI Flash Firmware”; not verified execution.

  4. 04
    Action

    Step 2: Inspect UEFI Variables

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 2: Inspect UEFI Variables”; not verified execution.

  5. 05
    Action

    Step 3: Analyze EFI System Partition (ESP)

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Analyze EFI System Partition (ESP)”; not verified execution.

  6. 06
    Action

    Inspect the ESP for unauthorized or modified boot components:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 3: Analyze EFI System Partition (ESP)”; not verified execution.

Inspect all extracted workflow candidates (25 candidate steps)
  1. 07
    Action

    Step 4: Scan Firmware for Known Bootkit Signatures

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Scan Firmware for Known Bootkit Signatures”; not verified execution.

  2. 08
    Action

    Analyze the firmware dump for known UEFI malware patterns:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 4: Scan Firmware for Known Bootkit Signatures”; not verified execution.

  3. 09
    Action

    Step 5: Detect Secure Boot Bypass Mechanisms

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Detect Secure Boot Bypass Mechanisms”; not verified execution.

  4. 10
    Action

    Check for known Secure Boot bypass techniques:

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 5: Detect Secure Boot Bypass Mechanisms”; not verified execution.

  5. 11
    Action

    Step 6: Perform Boot Chain Integrity Verification

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 6: Perform Boot Chain Integrity Verification”; not verified execution.

  6. 12
    Action

    Step 7: Document UEFI Bootkit Analysis Findings

    Source-described action candidate under “Step 7: Document UEFI Bootkit Analysis Findings”; not verified execution.

  7. 13
    Action

    Key Concepts

    Source-described action candidate under “Key Concepts”; not verified execution.

  8. 14
    Action

    Tools & Systems

    Source-described action candidate under “Tools & Systems”; not verified execution.

  9. 15
    Action

    Common Scenarios

    Source-described action candidate under “Common Scenarios”; not verified execution.

  10. 16
    Action

    Boot the system from a trusted Linux live USB to avoid executing any compromised OS components

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  11. 17
    Action

    Dump SPI flash firmware using `chipsecutil.py spi dump` for offline analysis

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  12. 18
    Action

    Mount the ESP and hash all `.efi` files for comparison against known-good values from identical hardware

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  13. 19
    Action

    Check for the `ESP:/system32/` directory (BlackLotus indicator) and unauthorized `grubx64.efi`

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  14. 20
    Action

    Extract firmware modules with UEFIExtract and compare GUID inventory against vendor baseline

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  15. 21
    Action

    Verify Secure Boot variables -- look for unauthorized MOK enrollment or modified db/dbx

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  16. 22
    Output

    Check SPI flash write protection and lock bits using chipsec modules

    Source-described output candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  17. 23
    Action

    Scan firmware dump and extracted modules with UEFI-specific YARA rules

    Source-described action candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  18. 24
    Decision

    If BlackLotus is suspected, check registry for HVCI disabled and MeasuredBoot logs for anomalous entries

    Source-described decision candidate under “Scenario: Investigating Persistent Compromise Surviving OS Reinstallation”; not verified execution.

  19. 25
    Output

    Output Format

    Source-described output candidate under “Output Format”; not verified execution.

Potential risk surfaces

Static findings identify points to inspect before installation. They do not establish that a skill is safe, malicious, or effective.

Items warrant review

20 deterministic lexical finding(s) require review across the collected text. Findings can occur in documentation and do not prove execution or exploitability; binary-only files were not scanned.

Network accessObserved
File writesObserved
Credential useNot observed
Medium

Network access is mentioned

2 occurrences

A URL or network client appears in this source line. Review destinations, data sent, and trust boundaries; static text cannot establish actual network activity. This rule matched 2 location(s) in the collected text; 2 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Note

File modification is described or implemented

18 occurrences

This line contains a possible file-write or redirection operation. Check destination paths and overwrite behavior; the static review did not write any file. This rule matched 18 location(s) in the collected text; 3 representative location(s) are cited. Matching text may be documentation, and the analyzer did not execute it.

Where context can be spent

Discovery, activation, and resource layers have different meanings. Exact values appear only when the official token-counting method was run with a named model.

Exact token counts unavailable

All token values, including per-file inventory, are null until the pipeline performs an official exact count with an explicit model.

No token measurement was recorded with the required official method. This dossier does not substitute character counts, file sizes, or estimates.

Controlled evaluation

No controlled evaluation

This skill has only the evidence identified above. No task success, token efficiency, latency, or quality advantage is claimed.

Not tested

Use with the source in view

Install command
Inspect the pinned source at https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/blob/54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57/skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md and follow the source repository's installation instructions. No installation was performed or verified by this static analyzer. Source license: Apache-2.0.

Prerequisites

  • Static analysis cannot assess runtime behavior, command success, network reachability, or model output quality.
  • No commands, scripts, network requests, model calls, or controlled skill executions were performed.
  • Category, tags, capabilities, workflows, and bilingual editorial summaries are deterministic candidates pending human review, not verified outcomes.
  • Exact token counts are unavailable until a later pipeline performs and records an official model-specific count.

Example prompts

Not provided

A decision, with its limits attached

Strengths

  • The snapshot contains 4 collected file(s), 2 Markdown file(s), and 1 script file(s), enabling source-level inspection. [Evidence: skills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence/SKILL.md:L1]

Considerations

  • No functional, security, or model-quality result has been established. Human review must inspect source context and all cited findings before installation or publication.
Research conclusion

Provisional deterministic static inventory only; pending human editorial review and, separately, controlled evaluation. No install recommendation, security assurance, or effectiveness claim is made.

Traceable by construction

The dossier is a time-bound reading of a public artifact, not an endorsement. Use the source link to inspect the exact upstream material.

mukul975Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skillsskills/analyzing-uefi-bootkit-persistence
Source type
Community
Commit
54a798831d2266a3ca61ce68a7acb80b81160d57
Collected
20 Nov 2026
Last checked
20 Nov 2026
Upstream license
Apache-2.0
Repository stars
36,446
Content basis

Deterministic lexical parsing, YAML frontmatter validation, file inventory, source-described workflow extraction, and heuristic provisional classification of the supplied files only. Generated by machine; no LLM, execution, dynamic testing, or human editorial approval.